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INTRODUCTION
This Article examines how misalignments in political and economic
interests among stakeholders in the gas supply industry impact the
effectiveness of relevant regulatory institutions.1 It builds on three
interrelated premises. First, law and regulation provide the cognizable
framework upon which institutions facilitate underlying policy objectives.
Second, in the context of gas and energy supply, the overarching policy
objectives typically comprise: (i) ensuring reasonable costs borne by
suppliers translates into reasonably affordable prices to consumers; (ii)
security and reliability of supply; and (iii) sustainability and curbing
externalities arising from the production and delivery of energy that would
harm the environment, health, and safety of the public. Thirdly, it is opined
that these highlighted objectives of energy policy, law, and regulation are
1. For the purpose of this Article, there are two broad classifications of
stakeholders in the gas supply industry: i.e. (1) the regulatory institutions,
comprised of the government and administrative agencies and lawmakers; and (2)
the regulated, comprised of upstream operators, producers and energy utilities,
and pipeline companies as well as social or environmental groups that participate
in or are affected by the decisions and rules made by the regulatory institutions.
See TADE OYEWUNMI, REGULATING GAS SUPPLY TO POWER MARKETS:
TRANSNATIONAL APPROACHES TO COMPETITIVENESS AND SECURITY OF SUPPLY
9–14, 78–84 (2018).
350308-LSU_EL_9-1_Text.indd  93 2/25/21  8:41 AM









   




    
  
  





   
   
  
 
   
    
  
 
      
  
  




    
       
      
  
 




892021] NATURAL GAS IN A CARBON-CONSTRAINED WORLD
not necessarily mutually exclusive or irreconcilable. The regulatory
system works more efficiently and effectively when institutions function
effectively and facilitate underlying objectives. In this regard, stakeholders
would also need to appreciate the peculiarities of the energy context and
interrelatedness of such objectives.2 
For instance, the vast array of supply infrastructure, market structures,
and regulatory initiatives adopted over the years (which arguably tend to
be more focused on cost and security of supply),3 has enabled natural gas
to reliably meet a significant proportion of energy needs in key sectors of
the U.S. economy.4 Nevertheless, upstream flaring and venting often arise
due to inadequate transmission pipelines or gas gathering capacity, or
other downstream offtake constraints. When flaring, venting, and leaks
occur, it leads to externalities such as carbon dioxide (CO2) and methane
emissions. The resulting harm is typically not internalized in the cost and
sales price of produced and consumed gas. The ideal scenario implies that
the relevant regulator(s) tasked with addressing such issues should be able
to make a rational and informed decision as to when the environmental
costs imposed by the emissions are impermissible or technically
unavoidable. Likewise, such decisions should (i) be without political
interference and (ii) not be seen as merely from the purview of commercial
and operational expediencies.5 Also, there should be mechanisms and
2. Id.
3. See Richard J. Pierce Jr., Reconstituting the Natural Gas Industry from 
Wellhead to Burnertip, 25 ENERGY L.J. 57 (2004) (on the evolution of the US gas
market and its regulatory framework).
4. See U.S. Energy Facts Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/us-energy-facts/ [https://perma.cc/UKP6-
YGYZ] (last updated May 7, 2020) (‘U.S. energy consumption by source and
sector, 2019’ and ‘US primary energy consumption by major sources 1950 –
2019’ charts). In 2019, natural gas accounted for 40%, 44%, and 39% of energy
consumed in the industrial, residential, and commercial sectors, respectively. The 
demand for gas is largely driven by the competitiveness of gas prices which also
fosters the switch from coal to gas utilization in the power sector, thereby reducing
the carbon-intensity of the power sector. The share of natural gas in power
generation increased from about 21% in 2008 to 34% in 2018. See INT’L ENERGY
AGENCY, ENERGY POLICIES OF IEA COUNTRIES: THE UNITED STATES 2019
REVIEW 155–56 (2019); U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 
2020, at 62–63 (2020), https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/AEO2020%20
Full%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/KT4T-3WNG].
5. Some of the key tenets of good quality regulation and institutional
frameworks which are also instrumental to the realization of energy policy
objectives include: (a) independence of regulatory institutions from undue
political influence and capture; (b) clarity of roles and curtailing information
350308-LSU_EL_9-1_Text.indd  94 2/25/21  8:41 AM








   
 
 
   
 
 
   







     
      




    
  
    
 
   
   
    
 
   






     
   
90 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
incentives to enable appropriate solutions such as capturing, storing, and
utilizing fugitive emissions that would otherwise be released into the
atmosphere.6 
The U.S. federal government under President Obama in 2013 initiated
the Climate Action Plan. The program inspired agencies to develop new
rules and regulations such as the Environmental Protection Agency’s
(EPA) 2012 and 2016 New Source Performance Standards (NSPS)7 aimed 
at curtailing emission of methane and Volatile Organic Compounds
(VOCs) from oil and gas operations. Also, the 2016 Bureau of Land
Management’s (BLM) rule aimed at regulating the waste of natural gas
through venting, flaring, and leaks from oil and gas activities on onshore
Federal and Indian (other than Osage Tribe) leases.8 These regulatory
actions are aimed at advancing the environmental protection and 
sustainability dimension of U.S. energy policy. The approach required the
consideration of the economic, social, and cost-benefit analysis of such
environmentally-inclined rules.9 However, a few days after the Trump-led 
asymmetry between the regulator and the regulated; (c) accountability and
transparency; and (d) regular stakeholder engagement and regular assessments
and performance evaluations. See ROBERT BALDWIN ET AL., UNDERSTANDING
REGULATION: THEORY, STRATEGY, AND PRACTICE 25–39 (2012).
6. See Recommended Technologies to Reduce Methane Emissions, U.S.
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/natural-gas-star-program/
recommended-technologies-reduce-methane-emissions [https://perma.cc/A7MP-
TYLD] (last visited Oct. 15, 2020); Heather D. Dziedzic & Tade Oyewunmi,
Decarbonization and the Integration of Renewables in Transitional Energy
Markets: Examining the Power to Gas Option in the United States, 4 OIL GAS &
ENERGY L. (2020).
7. Oil and Natural Gas Sector: New Source Performance Standards and
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Reviews, 77 Fed. Reg.
49,489 (Aug. 16, 2012) [hereinafter NSPS 2012]; Oil and Natural Gas Sector:
Emission Standards for New and Modified Sources, 81 Fed. Reg. 35,823 (June 3,
2016) (amending 40 C.F.R. pt. 60, subpt. 0000 and proposing new standards at
subpt. OOOOa) [hereinafter NSPS 2016].
8. Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource
Conservation, 81 Fed. Reg. 83,008, 83,013 (Nov. 18, 2016) (codified at 43 C.F.R.
pts. 3100, 3160, 3170) [hereinafter BLM 2016 Rule]. The regulations also clarify
when produced gas lost through venting, flaring, or leaks is subject to royalties, 
and when oil and gas production may be used royalty-free on-site. These
regulations replace the existing provisions related to venting, flaring, and royalty-
free use of gas contained in the 1979 Notice to Lessees and Operators of Onshore
Federal and Indian Oil and Gas Leases, Royalty or Compensation for Oil and Gas 
Lost (NTL-4A), which are over 3 decades old.
9. See Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011), which
provides among other things that the general principles of regulation require a
350308-LSU_EL_9-1_Text.indd  95 2/25/21  8:41 AM










   
 
 
















     








        
  





    
 
    
912021] NATURAL GAS IN A CARBON-CONSTRAINED WORLD
administration took office, and in-line with campaign promises, the
government issued Executive Order 13,783 of March 28, 2017. Executive
Order 13,783, tagged as ‘Promoting Energy Independence and Economic
Growth,’ aimed inter alia at the removal of certain regulatory burdens that
“unnecessarily obstruct, delay, curtail, or otherwise impose significant
costs on the siting, permitting, production, utilization, transmission, or
delivery of energy resources.”10 The executive actions that followed were
intriguing and depict the contentions arising mostly from the polarized
political and economic interest groups. The trend created policy flip-flops
between the very prescriptive approach to regulating greenhouse gases
(GHGs) and methane emissions by the EPA and the BLM under the
Obama administration compared to the Trump-era deregulatory approach.
Also, the contentions between interested stakeholders grew, despite the
plausible counter-productive implications of such controversies from an
energy policy standpoint. Some of the disputes can be seen from issues
leading to and arising from cases such as the Clean Air Council v. Pruitt11 
and Wyoming v. U.S. Department of Interior,12 discussed later in Part III
below.
regulatory system that protects public health, welfare, safety, and our environment
while promoting economic growth, innovation, competitiveness, and job creation.
The regulatory system must be based on the best available science, allowing for
public participation and an open exchange of ideas, promoting predictability, and
reducing uncertainty, while identifying and adopting the most innovative, and
least burdensome tools for achieving regulatory ends.
10. Exec. Order 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 28, 2017).
11. Clean Air Council v. Pruitt, 862 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2017). The D.C. Circuit
vacated the Trump EPA’s administrative stay of implementing portions of the
methane regulations in the NSPS 2016 rule issued by the Obama-era EPA. The
EPA sought to stay further judicial review and issued a temporary stay of the prior
rule pending the agency’s reconsideration of those methane regulations. The court
held, however, that the EPA failed to comply with the requirements for
reconsideration and stay contained in Clean Air Act § 307(d)(7)(B) and therefore
that the agency’s action was invalid.
12. Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 366 F. Supp. 3d 1284 (D. Wyo. 2018),
vacated, 768 F. App’x 790 (10th Cir. 2019). See also the Northern Alaska
Environmental Center v. U.S. Department of Interior opinion delivered on July 9,
2020 by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr., upholding a district court’s judgment in favor
of the BLM and the intervenor ConocoPhillips Alaska, Inc. in a National
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) action brought by environmental groups
challenging the BLM’s 2017 offer and sale of oil and gas leases in the National 
Petroleum Reserve-Alaska. 965 F.3d 705 (9th Cir.), amended at 983 F.3d 1077 
(2020). It was held that BLM’s issuance of the 2012 Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) under NEPA and integrated activity plan meant that it had met
350308-LSU_EL_9-1_Text.indd  96 2/25/21  8:41 AM




   
 









     
   
 
    
 
  
         
     
  









   











   
 
92 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
The case of Wyoming v. Zinke also shows the Obama-era versus
Trump-era rules and regulation contest that has ensued over the past three
years.13 In Zinke, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the suit
challenging the 2015 Obama-era rule. The dismissal was based on the 
Trump administration’s comments and the BLM’s July 2017 proposal to
officially rescind the Obama-era 2015 Rule.14 
Also, in the build-up towards the NSPS 2012 and 2016 rules, there
were several cases and quasi-judicial contests between industry groups,
states, and local governments on the one hand and environmental groups
on the other hand.15 The BLM 2016 rule aimed at curbing waste through
its statutory obligations for the 2017 lease sale of preparing at least an initial EIS, 
while the action was also time barred.
13. Wyoming v. Zinke, 871 F.3d 1133 (10th Cir. 2017). The 2015 rule was
aimed at tightening the regulation of hydraulic fracturing on Federal and Native
American lands.
14. Ultimately, the split three-judge panel dismissed the appeals and the
lower court case as “prudentially unripe” because BLM had commenced
rescinding the regulation.
15. See LINDA TSANG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44807, U.S. CLIMATE
CHANGE REGULATION AND LITIGATION: SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 2–39 (2017); 
Clean Air Council et al., Petition for Reconsideration on Final Rule Published at
77 Fed. Reg. 49,490 (NSPS 2012) (Oct. 15, 2012), https://downloads.reg
ulations.gov/EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0505-4575/attachment_2.pdf [https://perma.c
c/5GQU-AG35] (petitions by environmental groups asking EPA to reconsider
2012 NSPSs to address methane emissions, leading to further reviews and
eventual issuance of the NSPS 2016). Several states including Texas, Louisiana,
and Oklahoma, some state agencies, and industry and natural gas associations
such as the American Petroleum Institute and Interstate Natural Gas Association
of America filed petitions for a review of the NSPS 2016 final rule; while nine
states and Chicago filed statements to support the EPA’s final NSPS 2016 rule.
Notably, several environmental advocacy groups filed counter motions to
intervene in the case, thus, all petitions were consolidated with the lead case. See
Order of Consolidation, Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, No. 13-1108 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 
4, 2017), http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/
uploads/sites/16/case-documents/2017/20170104_docket-13-1108_order.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/PN83-3TGC]. In a related development after the EPA issued an
Information Collection Request (ICR) pursuant to the NSPS 2016 rule to oil and
natural gas companies seeking information on their existing oil and gas sources
as a first step to regulating their methane, the EPA under the Trump administration
withdrew the ICR to assess the need for this information and to reduce the burden
it places on operators. The withdrawal was made following a letter by nine state 
attorneys general and two governors asking that the ICR be suspended and
withdrawn. See Proposed Information Collection Request; Comment Request;
Information Collection Effort for Oil and Gas Facilities, 81 Fed. Reg. 35,763
350308-LSU_EL_9-1_Text.indd  97 2/25/21  8:41 AM













   
   
 
   
   
   
 
   





   




   
        
   
    
 
     
  
       







   
     
932021] NATURAL GAS IN A CARBON-CONSTRAINED WORLD
flaring and venting of gas by imposing a cost (i.e., royalties) on practices
considered to be an avoidable waste of gas that occurs through flaring and
venting. It created an obligation to capture and utilize such avoidable
waste which also incidentally prevents methane emissions. Despite its
objectives, the BLM 2016 rule faced significant challenges from political
and economic interest groups and vehement support by environmental
groups and other stakeholders.16 
It is expected that government administrations as well as the political
or economic paradigms they expound can change over time. A newly
elected president is fully entitled to pursue campaign promises that imply
a revision or rejection of a prior president's policies. However, it is
important to keep the tenets of good quality regulatory and institutional
structures. In an ideal context, such good quality institutions can better
facilitate the three dimensions of an energy policy and regulation. The
notion of regulatory independence and accountability suggests that
institutions should be apolitical enough not to “simply discard prior factual
findings without a reasoned explanation.”17 Thus, this Article seeks to
highlight this normative claim by discussing the challenge of curbing
methane and fugitive GHG emissions from gas supply systems. It explores
the role(s) of regulatory institutions in this regard and considers the
framework for regulating operations subject to private ownership of
resources on the one hand and those regarding publicly owned resources
and operations subject to federal regulation and oversight by agencies such
as the BLM on the other hand. Note that the U.S. federal licensing and
regulatory framework is also akin to the domanial paradigms in
(June 3, 2016); Notice Regarding Withdrawal of Obligation to Submit
Information, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,817 (Mar. 7, 2017).
16. See Blake A. Watson, Nullify, Postpone, Suspend, Stay, and Replace: The
Trump Administration and the Methane Waste Prevention Rule, 44 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 363 (2019); Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., The Control of Methane and VOC
Emissions from Oil and Gas Operations in the Western United States, 54 IDAHO 
L. REV. 213 (2018); Bradley N. Kershaw, Flames, Fixes, and the Road Forward:
The Waste Prevention Rule and BLM Authority to Regulate Natural Gas Flaring
and Venting, 29 COLO. NAT. RESOURCES ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. 115 (2018).
17. In FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., Justice Scalia opines that
agencies may reconsider past decisions and, with a reasoned explanation, to
revise, replace or repeal a decision that is within their discretion. 556 U.S. 502,
515 (2009). Thus, agencies cannot run from underlying facts, contested issues, or
past statutory interpretations and associated reasoning explaining past policy
choices for the sake of dancing to the tunes of one interest group against the other,
simply because the favored interest group supported or supports the government.
See Jody Freeman, The 2017 Roscoe Pound Lecture, The Limits of Executive
Power: The Obama-Trump Transition, 96 NEB. L. REV. 545, 567 (2018).
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94 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
jurisdictions outside the U.S. in which ownership of land and mineral
resources in situ is vested in the government and managed by the state.
Part I explores the facts and figures on energy-related GHG emissions, 
in particular, methane emissions as a potent GHG. It con siders the
implications of gas flaring and venting which potentially increase the
release of other unwanted externalities and air pollutants. Part II discusses
the typical gas supply value chain, focusing on the strains that
environmental and climate change-related regulation places on relevant
operators. It discusses the legal, policy, and regulatory dynamics of gas
production and supply operations and matters arising in a carbon-
constrained context. Part III goes further in examining the institutions and
regulatory approaches to gas supply and energy; the production boom and
interconnections with electricity supply; and the challenge of controlling
CO2, VOCs, and methane emissions in this regard while attempting to
pursue defined energy policy objectives. It concludes by examining the
undue influences faced by regulatory institutions that seem to mainly arise
from divergent political inclinations and the drive to protect vested
economic interests. The conclusion points out that these interests can and
should be aligned to enable an effective framework that fosters innovative
solutions to the challenge of GHG emissions in the oil and gas context.
I. ENERGY-RELATED EMISSIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL EXTERNALITIES
There is a growing imperative to effectively curb the atmospheric
concentration of GHGs, such as CO2 and methane. In highlighting the
scientific basis for the need to decarbonize, the EPA points out that:
[C]oncentrations of heat-trapping "greenhouse gases" . . . in the
atmosphere absorb some of the energy being radiated from the
surface of the Earth that would otherwise be lost to space,
essentially acting like a blanket that makes the Earth's surface
warmer than it would be otherwise. Greenhouse gases are
necessary to life as we know it. Without greenhouse gases to create
the natural heat-trapping properties of the atmosphere, the planet's
surface would be about 60 degrees Fahrenheit cooler than present .
. . . Carbon dioxide is also necessary for plant growth. With
emissions from biological and geological sources, there is a natural
level of greenhouse gases that is maintained in the atmosphere.
Human emissions of greenhouse gases and subsequent changes in 
atmospheric concentrations alter the balance of energy transfers
between space and the earth system . . . . A gauge of these changes
is called radiative forcing, which is a measure of a substance’s total
net effect on the global energy balance for which a positive number
350308-LSU_EL_9-1_Text.indd  99 2/25/21  8:41 AM











    
   
 






         













    
   
 
  
     
 
    
   
   
   
    
     
      
952021] NATURAL GAS IN A CARBON-CONSTRAINED WORLD
represents a warming effect and a negative number represents a
cooling effect . . . . [The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC)] concluded in its most recent scientific assessment
report that it is extremely likely that human influences have been the
dominant cause of warming since the mid-20th century.18 
Two interesting conclusions can be inferred from the above quote. First,
the release and concentration of GHGs into the atmosphere is in itself not
ipso facto dangerous, as long as such is part of the natural systemic
balance. For instance, trees and plants need CO2 which is, for instance,
exhaled by humans as much as humans need oxygen released by trees and
plants. The earth also needs some of the warming effects created following
the release and concentration of GHGs and subsequent radiative impacts.
Second, and unfortunately, over the past 200 years, human activities that
are simply socio-economic or industrial have led to atmospheric changes
in the natural balance of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere.19 
18. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 430-R-19-001, INVENTORY OF
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS 1990-2017, at 1-3 (2019) (emphasis
added). The report further states that “If greenhouse gas concentrations continue
to increase, climate models predict that the average temperature at the Earth's
surface is likely to increase from 0.5 to 8.6 degrees Fahrenheit above 1986 through
2005 levels by the end of this century, depending on future emissions and the
responsiveness of the climate system.” Id. In December 2015, the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of Parties
(COP) 21 in Paris reached a significant agreement (i.e. the “Paris Agreement”)
which aimed inter alia to (i) accelerate and intensify the global actions and
investments needed for a sustainable low carbon future, (ii) combat climate 
change and adapt to its effects, and (iii) drive efforts in keeping global temperature
rise this century well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels and to
pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase even further to 1.5 degrees Celsius.
Considering the role of energy-related emissions, there is growing attention on
decarbonization pathways that would be consistent with 2 degrees Celsius
warming scenarios. All parties to the agreement are required to implement 
“nationally determined contributions” (NDCs), including regular reporting
obligations on emissions and reduction implementation efforts. See INT’L ENERGY 
AGENCY, ENERGY, CLIMATE CHANGE, AND ENVIRONMENT: 2016 INSIGHTS 11–12 
(2016).
19. It has been reported that human activities are estimated to have caused
approximately 1.0°C of global warming above pre-industrial levels, with a likely
range of 0.8°C to 1.2°C. Global warming is likely to reach 1.5°C between 2030
and 2052 if it continues to increase at the current rate. See Masson-Delmotte et
al., Summary for Policymakers in INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C: AN IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON THE
IMPACTS OF GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C ABOVE PRE-INDUSTRIAL LEVELS AND
350308-LSU_EL_9-1_Text.indd  100 2/25/21  8:41 AM







   
  
   



















     
   
      
 
      
 
   
   
   
   
      
   
  
      
  
     
    
      
   
96 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
The greenhouse effect is primarily a function of the concentration of
water vapor, CO2, methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), and other trace
gases in the atmosphere that absorb the terrestrial radiation leaving the
surface of the Earth.20 Some GHGs occur naturally including water vapor,
CO2, CH4, N2O, and ozone (O3). Several classes of halogenated
substances that contain fluorine, chlorine, or bromine are also greenhouse
gases, but those are mostly a by-product of industrial activities.21 There
are also short-lived substances with climatic effects and spatially variable
radiative forcing impacts, such as carbon monoxide (CO), nitrogen
dioxide (NO2), sulfur dioxide (SO2), and tropospheric (ground level)
ozone (O3). The tropospheric ozone is formed from chemical reactions in
the atmosphere as precursor pollutants, which include VOCs and methane
and nitrogen oxides (NOx), in the presence of ultraviolet light (sunlight).22 
Although GHGs, such as carbon dioxide, methane, and N2O, are
continuously emitted to and removed from the atmosphere by natural
processes, it is noteworthy that anthropogenic activities, like the 
combustion of hydrocarbon, cement production, and heavy industry (steel
and aluminum), land-use, land-use change, and forestry, agriculture, or
waste management lead to the release of additional quantities changing
their global average atmospheric concentrations and the natural balance.23 
Another plausible inference is that anthropogenic emissions and the
concentration of GHGs are not only a result of hydrocarbon exploration,
production, and combustion. Rather, such emissions arise due to a mix of
almost all activities that are essential to socio-economic development and
RELATED GLOBAL GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION PATHWAYS, IN THE CONTEXT OF
STRENGTHENING THE GLOBAL RESPONSE TO THE THREAT OF CLIMATE CHANGE,
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, AND EFFORTS TO ERADICATE POVERTY (2018)
[hereinafter IPCC Summary for Policymakers 2018].
20. See Overview of Greenhouse Gases, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/overview-greenhouse-gases [https://perma.cc
/2Z94-ZDKZ] (last visited Jan. 10, 2021).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU) activities accounted
for around 13% of CO2, 44% of methane (CH4), and 81% of nitrous oxide (N2O)
emissions from human activities globally during 2007-2016, representing 23%
(12.0 ± 2.9 GtCO2eq yr-1) of total net anthropogenic emissions of GHGs during
the period. See P.R. Shukla et al., Summary for Policymakers in
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE AND 
LAND: AN IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON CLIMATE CHANGE, DESERTIFICATION, LAND 
DEGRADATION, SUSTAINABLE LAND MANAGEMENT, FOOD SECURITY, AND 
GREENHOUSE GAS FLUXES IN TERRESTRIAL ECOSYSTEMS (2019); see also IPCC
Summary for Policymakers 2018, supra note 19.
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972021] NATURAL GAS IN A CARBON-CONSTRAINED WORLD
modernization such as industry, forestry, and agriculture. Hence,
advocating for the shutdown of an industry as the only pathway to
decarbonization and climate mitigation without any consideration of the
socio-economic and other direct or indirect implications or costs could be
regarded as a one-sided approach to a three-dimensional energy policy
issue. A more pragmatic and holistic approach would include a
consideration of pathways through which the industry can evolve towards
a carbon-neutral or decarbonized character and efficiently curb the
harmful externalities of its operations and keep the socio-economic
benefits.24 
To illustrate the point, assume a scenario in which Mr. (X) has a
conglomerate comprised of three companies. Company (A) manages a
ranch that produces beef and milk for manufacturers of sausages and
yogurt respectively. Company (B) is one that engages in building large-
scale solar and wind farms, and construction. Company B also invests in
international mining of resources such as lithium and cobalt in South
America or Central Africa. The international mining operations are
integral to company B’s battery energy storage requirements and
reliability of its energy systems. Both companies A and B require a
significant amount of land-use and activities such as beef farming that
could also result in waste management issues and methane emissions.
Company (C) on the other hand engages in the production and supply of
oil and gas. It is noted here that Mr. X’s company (C) is more likely to be
singled-out, criticized, and sued for being engaged in climate change
causing activities even though all three ventures and business activities 
have environmental implications and contribute to GHG emissions. Thus,
policy-makers and all stakeholders ought to at least objectively examine
the costs and benefits of such targeted campaigns and seek more balanced
and pragmatic pathways towards cleaner and decarbonized energy supply
systems.25 Given the highlighted complexities of climate change 
24. See Tade Oyewunmi et al., Introduction: Energy in a Carbon-
Constrained World in DECARBONIZATION AND THE ENERGY INDUSTRY: LAW,
POLICY, AND REGULATION IN LOW-CARBON ENERGY MARKETS 1–12 (Tade 
Oyewunmi et al. eds., 2020).
25. For a discussion on a realistic approach to addressing the environmental 
or climatic implications of energy, oil, and gas activities in a carbon-constrained
world, where calls for banning all oil and gas activities seem to gain traction, see
Monika U. Ehrman, A Call for Energy Realism: When Immanuel Kant Met the
Keep it in the Ground Movement, 2019 UTAH L. REV. 435. See also Richard J.
Pierce, Pipeline Opposition Impedes Climate Change Mitigation, REG. REV.
(Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.theregreview.org/2018/09/13/pipeline-opposition-
impedes-climate-change-mitigation/ [https://perma.cc/Z4WZ-7FWK].
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mitigation; it is worth asking whether operators in the energy and oil and 
gas sector should be viewed as the problem, or only part of the problem,
or considered as an essential part of the solution?26 
Based on the U.S. EPA’s Inventory of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and
Sinks 1990-2017, Figure 1 below illustrates that energy-related emissions
are the most prevalent source of GHG emissions in the U.S. It follows the
IPCC sectoral classifications, which are composed of land-use and land-
use change and forestry, agriculture, waste, energy, and industrial
processes.27 The emissions trend started to decline in 2014 mostly due to
the growing switch from coal-fired electricity to gas-fired power and other
less carbon-intensive sources; the growth in zero-carbon renewables
(especially solar and wind), including energy efficiency and conservation;
and the electrification of various key demand sectors, such as
transportation, services, and manufacturing.28 
26. See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY IN ENERGY
TRANSITIONS: WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK SPECIAL REPORT (2020), https://
www.iea.org/reports/the-oil-and-gas-industry-in-energy-transitions [https://perm
a.cc/4BDN-RSR5].
27. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 18, at ES-18; INT’L ENERGY
AGENCY, supra note 4, at 43–44. In 2017, energy-related emissions accounted for
84% of total emissions followed by the agriculture sector (8%), industrial process
emissions (6%), and the waste sector (2%). Energy-related emissions, including
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, were mostly from fossil fuel combustion, as well 
as other emission sources such as methane leakage from natural gas systems as
shown in Figure 3 below.
28. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 18, at ES-18; see also Dziedzic 
& Oyewunmi, supra note 6.
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99 2021] NATURAL GAS IN A CARBON-CONSTRAINED WORLD 
Figure 1: U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks by Chapter/IPCC Sector (MMT
CO2) 1990-201729 [see https://perma.cc/596Z-KB9V for full-color version]. 
The same trend can be inferred from Figure 2 below concerning the
electric power sector in the U.S. Notably, GHG emissions in electricity
show a steep decline from 2014 onwards compared to the rise in emissions
attributable to other sectors, such as transportation, while emissions from
agriculture, industrial, commercial, and residential uses remained
relatively flat or the same.30 
Figure 2: U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Economic Sector From 1990 to 201731 
[https://perma.cc/596Z-KB9V]. 
29. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 18, at 2-7. 
30. See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 4, at 44–46. Emissions reductions
in the power sector contributed to over 70% of total reductions in energy-related
emissions in the United States in the last decade. Growth in renewables and in
natural gas-fired generation each accounted for roughly half of power sector
emissions reductions. 
31. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 18, at 2-24. 
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In a global context, the International Energy Agency (IEA) reports that
the decrease in CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion is attributable
in part to (i) the gradual shift from coal to natural gas in the electricity and
heat sector, (ii) increased use of renewables in the electric power sector,
and (iii) fluctuations in demand and energy usage and efficiency, among
other reasons.32 As the use of renewable energy increases, the carbon-
intensity of energy supply systems consequently decreases. The most
carbon-intensive source of electric power has been coal. Coal-fired
generation accounts for 30% of global energy-related CO2 emissions.33 
Thus, it is reasonable to plan for the efficient elimination or reduction of
reliance on coal by switching to cleaner primary energy sources. It is noted
that a significant proportion of coal generation capacity in major emerging
economies is currently just about twelve years old, even though the
average economic lifespan of such coal-plants is about forty years.34 
Recent trends show that shifts in the economy and policy have driven the
gradual switch from coal to gas-fired power generation thereby reducing 
the carbon intensity of global energy use.35 
In the U.S., carbon-intensive coal had previously provided about half
of the total primary energy for electricity generation and continues to
experience a steep decline. Notwithstanding the environmental
externalities,36 a positive impact of the shale revolution is the supply of






36. Flaring and venting of natural gas in the Permian basin in Texas and New
Mexico reached an all-time record high in the third quarter of 2019, averaging
more than 750 million cubic feet per day (MMcfd). Increased flaring and venting
at the production wellhead is mostly attributed to higher activity levels, more
production from areas with less developed gas gathering infrastructure, and basin-
wide takeaway ‘pipeline’ capacity bottlenecks. See Permian Gas Flaring Reaches
Yet Another High, RYSTAD ENERGY (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.rystadenergy
.com/newsevents/news/press-releases/permian-gas-flaring-reaches-yet-another-h
igh/ [https://perma.cc/P7DK-4FTE]; Rachel Adams-Heard & Catherine Ngai, The 
Permian Gas Problem is Just Getting Worse, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Dec. 24,
2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-12-24/permian-gas-prob
lem-just-gets-worse-as-shale-drilling-slows-down [https://perma.cc/V38J-APG
W]. See also Monika U. Ehrman, Earthquakes in the Oilpatch: The Regulatory
and Legal Issues Arising Out of Oil and Gas Operation Induced Seismicity, 33 
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 609 (2017).
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1012021] NATURAL GAS IN A CARBON-CONSTRAINED WORLD
cheaper, less-carbon-intensive, and more abundant domestic gas.37 Gas
supply for electricity generation increased by 66% within the past ten years
in the U.S.38 
As part of the energy-sector emissions highlighted in Figure 1, it could
be opined that fossil fuel combustion, natural gas systems, non-energy use
of fuels, petroleum systems, coal mining, and stationary combustion all
contributed to GHG emissions in the proportions highlighted in Figure 3
below. Thus, energy-related initiatives for curbing emissions should
reasonably include the highlighted segments of the energy value chain.
U.S. Energy Sector Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks, 2017 
Fossil Fuel Combustion Natural Gas Systems 
Non-Energy Use of Fuels Petroleum Systems 
Coal Mining Stationary Combustion 
Mobile Combustion Incineration of Waste 
Figure 3: Sources of U.S. Energy Sector Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 2017 [see
https://perma.cc/596Z-KB9V for full version].
Globally, about 15% of energy-related GHG emissions arise from oil
and gas exploration, the production processes, and delivery to
consumers.39 Thus, reducing fugitive emissions and curbing avoidable 
leaks from oil and gas systems is a reasonable means of decarbonizing the
value chain. There are ample cost-effective means of reaching such
objectives. These include eliminating or minimizing gas flaring and
venting, curtailing methane emissions, and integrating renewables and
low-carbon electricity into new upstream and liquefied natural gas (LNG)
developments. Other options include investing in carbon removal and
37. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 4, at 182–83.
38. Id.; see also U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN, supra note 4, at 62 (on 
‘Electricity generation from selected fuels’).
39. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 26.
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recycling technologies,40 carbon capture utilization and storage (CCUS),41 
or power-to-gas and hydrogen, methane gathering and reformation,
bioenergy systems.42 The oil and gas operators could also expand or
transform into “energy” companies investing in and supplying an
increasing amount of final, usable energy forms derivable from low or
zero-carbon sources, such as hydrogen, wind, and solar.
There is now a growing trend towards climate change litigation suits
against the main multinational oil operators as a means of slowing down
further oil and gas development.43 There are several reasons why such a
litigious approach may not be as effective as creating an enabling
environment in which the relevant firms could evolve into cleaner energy
operators and more sustainable carbon-neutral or zero-carbon operators.
First, there is an institutionalized web of property and economic rights,
public and private contracts, international and domestic investment law,
soft and hard laws, and regulatory instruments that have evolved over the
past century which govern petroleum industry operations (some of which
are discussed below in Part II (A) and (B) of this Article). From an
international energy law and policy perspective, using one or more private
firms often overlooks elements such as the built-in mechanisms for
resolving energy industry-related risks and disputes which mostly have
international and governmental elements involving several host
governments and economies.
The International Oil Companies (IOCs) do not operate oil and gas
licenses alone, rather they mostly operate under joint ventures, production
sharing, and/or service or joint operating agreements with the host
government and National Oil Companies (NOCs). These host
governments or NOCs typically hold the majority interests under a
40. Eli Kintisch, Technologies, in CLIMATE ENGINEERING AND THE LAW:
REGULATION AND LIABILITY FOR SOLAR RADIATION MANAGEMENT AND CARBON
DIOXIDE REMOVAL 28–56 (Michael B. Gerrard & Tracy Hester eds., 2018).
41. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 26, at 121–60. See also OIL & GAS 
CLIMATE INITIATIVE, SCALING UP ACTION: AIMING FOR NET ZERO EMISSIONS
(2019), https://oilandgasclimateinitiative.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/OGC
I-Annual-Report-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/W992-BWPQ].
42. See Dziedzic & Oyewunmi, supra note 6; Kintisch, supra note 40, at 28– 
56; LEGAL PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES
(Michael B. Gerrard & John C. Dernback eds., 2019).
43. See Mark Clarke & Tallat Hussain, Climate Change Litigation: A New
Class of Action, WHITE & CASE (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.whitecase.com
/publications/insight/climate-change-litigation-new-class-action [https://perma.c
c/Q9XV-XF7L]. An increased sense of global urgency and public awareness
around climate change-related risks, along with national laws and international
commitments, is driving a new class of litigation.
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1032021] NATURAL GAS IN A CARBON-CONSTRAINED WORLD
contractual framework that entails the notion of “joint and several”
liability.44 Additionally, the bulk of current oil and gas reserves are held 
and developed by NOCs and host governments of countries whose
economic development projections and socio-political programs are
typically tied to revenues from oil, gas, and energy development.45 
Furthermore, it would be untenable to overlook international law
principles such as “permanent sovereignty over natural resources”
accorded to resource-rich countries. While a further examination of these
complex issues is beyond the scope of this Article, it is useful to note
Clarke and Hussain’s comments that the key drivers for climate change
litigation globally include: (i) compensation for the costs of adaptation to
climate change; (ii) challenging climate change-related legislation and
policies, or their application; (iii) preventing future emissions and
contributions to climate change; (iv) requiring governments or regulators
to take action to meet national or international commitments; and (v)
raising awareness and exerting pressure on corporate actors, regulators or
investors.46 
A. GHGs, Methane, and VOCs
In transitional energy contexts, the issue of reliability (on the one
hand) and decarbonization of natural gas exploration, production, and
supply to power markets (on the other hand) are interrelated and essential.
Clarifying the impact of utilizing fossil fuels (including gas, albeit to a
lesser extent compared to coal) on GHG emissions is also important. So,
44. See Kim Talus et al., Lex Petrolea and the Internationalization of
Petroleum Agreements: Focus on Host Government Contracts, 5 J. WORLD
ENERGY L. & BUS. 181 (2012); Terence Daintith, Against ‘Lex Petrolea’, 10 J.
WORLD ENERGY L. & BUS. 1 (2017); ERNEST E. SMITH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
PETROLEUM TRANSACTIONS 30–410 (Ernest E. Smith et al. eds., 3d ed. 2010).
45. According to the IEA, the “Majors [IOCs] account for 12% of oil and gas
reserves, 15% of production and 10% of estimated emissions from industry
operations. National oil companies (NOCs)—fully or majority-owned by national
governments—account for well over half of global production and an even larger
share of reserves. There are some high-performing NOCs, but many are poorly 
positioned to adapt to changes in global energy dynamics.” INT’L ENERGY
AGENCY, supra note 26.
46. Clarke & Hussain, supra note 43. Climate-change suits could be said to
(a) hold the government to their legislative and policy commitments; (b) link the
impacts of resource extraction to climate change and resilience; (c) establish that
particular emissions are the proximate cause of particular adverse climate change
impacts; and/or (d) establish liability for failures (of efforts) to adapt to climate
change and applying the public trust doctrine to climate change.
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104 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
understanding the nature of natural gas systems and how they contribute
to emissions generally is useful in crafting pragmatic solutions to contain
such emissions. In the U.S., natural gas systems consist of hundreds of
thousands of wells, processing facilities, and over a million miles of
transmission and distribution pipelines.47 Compared to 1990 levels, there
was a 14% decrease in CO2 and methane emissions from such systems in
2017, while there was a less than 1% decrease compared to 2016
emissions.48 
Methane is the main component of natural gas, thus to design an
effective decarbonization policy, understanding its occurrence alongside
other relevant GHGs such as CO2 and VOCs from gas systems is 
essential.49 Methane is composed of one atom of carbon and four atoms of
hydrogen and typically formed through the decomposition of organic
materials in the absence of oxygen.50 Generally, it is released into the
atmosphere from natural sources such as wetlands, oceans, sediments,
termites, volcanoes, and wildfires as well as human activities such as oil
and natural gas systems, coal mines, landfills, wastewater treatment
facilities, and the raising of livestock.51 While carbon dioxide is the most
prevalent GHG;52 methane or CH4 is noted to have eighty times the global
47. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 18; OYEWUNMI, supra note 1, at
85–90; Dziedzic & Oyewunmi, supra note 6.
48. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 18.
49. Natural gas is a combustible mixture of hydrocarbon gases that is primarily
comprised of methane and could include ethane, propane, butane and pentane.
Impurities such as carbon dioxide, helium, nitrogen and hydrogen sulfide can also
be present. Methane is a molecule made up of one carbon atom and four hydrogen
atoms, and is referred to as CH4. See Background, NATURALGAS.ORG, 
http://naturalgas.org/overview/background/ [https://perma.cc/N5MD-L3KV] (last
visited Jan. 10, 2021); Oil Field Glossary: Natural Gas, SCHLUMBERGER, 
https://www.glossary.oilfield.slb.com/Terms/n/natural_gas.aspx [https://perma.cc/
SD56-SSFG] (last visited Jan. 10, 2021).
50. RICHARD K. LATTANZIO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF10752, METHANE 
EMISSIONS: A PRIMER (2018).
51. Id.
52. Carbon dioxide enters the atmosphere through burning fossil fuels (coal,
natural gas, and oil), solid waste, trees and other biological materials, and as a
result of certain chemical reactions (e.g. manufacture of cement). Carbon dioxide 
is removed from the atmosphere (or "sequestered") when it is absorbed by plants
as part of the biological carbon cycle. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) reports that in 2017 CO2 comprised 82% of GHGs, while methane was
10%, nitrous oxide was 6%, and fluorinated gases (such as hydrofluorocarbons,
perfluorocarbons, sulfur hexafluoride, and nitrogen trifluoride—synthetic,
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1052021] NATURAL GAS IN A CARBON-CONSTRAINED WORLD
warming potential of carbon dioxide when considered within twenty
years.53 In particular, methane stays for a much shorter period, i.e. about
twelve years in the atmosphere compared to the 100 years carbon-dioxide
stays in the atmosphere when emitted.54 It reportedly has several indirect
effects on human health, crop yields, and the quality and productivity of
vegetation through its role as an important precursor to the formation of
tropospheric ozone.55 
Natural gas and by implication, methane, comes with several benefits
as a primary source of energy. For instance, when used in power
generation, the gas-fired power plant emits less than half of the amount of
CO2 as a typical coal-fired power plant does and one-quarter less than oil
combustion per unit of energy.56 Additionally, using methane or gas-to-
power does not lead to emissions of mercury, particulate matter, or sulfur
dioxide which are emitted by coal-fired generation. Also, gas-to-power
systems result in fewer nitrogen oxides per unit of energy than either coal
or oil.57 The United Kingdom (UK), for example, exemplifies the
emissions-reducing impact of switching from coal to gas-fired power.58 
powerful greenhouse gases that are emitted from a variety of industrial processes) 
was 3%. See Overview of Greenhouse Gases, supra note 20.
53. LATTANZIO, supra note 50; Reitze, supra note 16, at 215.
54. Methane is a short-lived climate pollutant with an atmospheric lifetime 
of around 12 years. While its lifetime in the atmosphere is much shorter than
carbon dioxide (CO2), it is much more efficient at trapping radiation. Per unit of
mass, the impact of methane on climate change over 20 years is 84 times greater
than CO2; over a 100-year period it is 28 times greater. See CLIMATE & CLEAN
AIR COAL., 2018 ANNUAL SCIENCE UPDATE: METHANE BRIEFING REPORT 1–11 
(2018), https://ccacoalition.org/en/file/4546/download?token=dnXRNg7j [https:
//perma.cc/WF9C-SQY4]; see also Methane, CLIMATE & CLEAN AIR COALITION,
https://www.ccacoalition.org/en/slcps/methane [https://perma.cc/6P5E-Y8MP]
(last visited Jan. 10, 2021); Reitze, supra note 16.
55. EPA classifies methane as both a precursor to ground-level ozone
formation (commonly referred to as "smog") and a potent greenhouse gas (GHG).
56. RICHARD K. LATTANZIO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42986, METHANE
AND OTHER AIR POLLUTION ISSUES IN NATURAL GAS SYSTEMS 1 (updated Sept.
17, 2020).
57. Id. See also Richard Pierce, The Past, Present, and Future of Energy
Regulation, 31 UTAH ENVTL L. REV. 291, 308 (2011).
58. U.K. DEP’T FOR BUS., ENERGY & INDUS. STRATEGY, 2018 UK
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS, PROVISIONAL FIGURES (2019) https://assets
.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data 
/file/790626/2018-provisional-emissions-statistics-report.pdf. [https://perma.cc/
NGZ5-85D6]. The UK’s DBES reports that “Carbon dioxide emissions in the
energy supply sector decreased by 7.2 per cent (7.7 Mt), between 2017 and 2018
driven by a change in the fuel mix for electricity generation . . . . Since 1990, UK
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According to the UK’s DBES report, even though electricity consumption 
was 8% higher in 2018 compared to consumption levels in 1990, the
overall emissions from power stations were 68% lower in 2018 than in
1990.59 The decline in emissions was inter alia attributed to the growing
switch from coal to gas and renewable energy sources, such as offshore
wind.60 Advancements in energy efficiency and improvements in the
technology used by energy-intensive industries were also crucial.61 To 
continue playing its role in a low-carbon but the carbon-constrained world,
the natural gas industry would need to deal with its emissions and
environmental externalities. Such posture is also in accord with the drive
for efficiently integrating the growing share of renewables in conventional
and existing energy grids.62 
The benefits of methane and natural gas include serving as a feedstock
for household and industrial products such as petrochemicals, plastic,
fertilizer, antifreeze, and fabrics. The value chain created along with the
production, distribution and utilization of methane or natural gas comes
with socio-economic impacts such as job creation and industrial
development. Unfortunately, fugitive emissions from the gas production
and supply chain occur mostly due to: (i) the leaks along the production,
transmission, and process phases; (iii) venting and combustion of natural
gas in the course of production operations; and (iii) the combustion of
other fossil fuel resources or other emissions during associated
operations.63 Some methane is also emitted as a byproduct of coal mining
carbon dioxide emissions have decreased by 39 per cent. This decrease has 
resulted mainly from changes in the mix of fuels being used for electricity
generation, with a shift away from coal and growth in the use of renewable energy
sources. This was combined with lower electricity demand, owing to greater
efficiency resulting from improvements in technology and a decline in the relative
importance of energy intensive industries.”
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. In 2018, coal made up only 7% of fuel used for electricity generation
in the UK, down from 65% in 1990. Nuclear and renewables, which are net-zero
carbon energy sources, accounted for 47% of fuels used for electricity generation
in 2018, up from 22% in 1990.
62. Dziedzic & Oyewunmi, supra note 6.
63. LATTANZIO, supra note 50. Sources of emissions include road and
pipeline construction; well drilling, completion, and flowback activities; and gas
processing and transmission equipment such as controllers, compressors,
dehydrators, pipes, and storage vessels. Pollutants include, most prominently,
methane (i.e., the principal component of natural gas) and volatile organic
compounds (VOCs)—of which the natural gas industry is one of the highest-
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1072021] NATURAL GAS IN A CARBON-CONSTRAINED WORLD
or incomplete combustion during gas flaring operations. The often
suggested solutions to reduce methane emissions include pre-mining 
degasification, recovery, and oxidation of methane; monitoring leaks
along gas transmission and distribution networks. Other initiatives are
capturing, storage, gathering, and processing fugitive emissions from
power generation and industrial emitters. As well as using renewable
energy systems to power production operations and facilities.64 
II. NATURAL GAS SYSTEMS UNDER CARBON CONSTRAINTS
Natural gas exploration and production occurs from associated gas
fields composed of reservoirs in which oil is found together with a cap of
a mixture of hydrocarbon gases including mostly methane and lesser
amounts of ethane, propane, butane, pentane, and impurities such as
nitrogen and helium.65 Gas is produced from non-associated gas fields
consisting of reservoirs that contain only the mixture of hydrocarbon gases
and no oil. Advancements in unconventional drilling technologies, such as
horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing, allow natural gas embedded
in shale rock formations (i.e. shale gas) to be produced. The exploration
and production of natural gas are capital-intensive and require significant
technical expertise and resources. Likewise, the capturing, storing,
gathering, and processing of gas involves a unique set of regulatory and
permitting hurdles, contracting with established and creditworthy buyers,
and planning.66 
Compared to other hydrocarbons, natural gas has some peculiar
features that distinguish it from oil as a primary source of energy. For
example, (i) its physical properties (i.e. gas being of a lower density but
higher volatility than oil), burning qualities, and thermal efficiency (gas is
cleaner and relatively more efficient for power generation, especially
compared to coal);67 and (ii) the requirements for storing and marketing
emitting industrial sectors in the United States—as well as nitrogen oxides, sulfur
dioxide (SO2), and various forms of hazardous air pollutants (HAPs).
64. Id.; see also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 18; Reitze, supra
note 16.
65. Oil Field Glossary: Natural Gas, supra note 49.
66. Pierce, supra note 3; Buford Pollett, The Impact of the Interface of
Regulatory Jurisdictional Issues on the Life Cycle of Natural Gas Pipelines in the
United States of America, 5 OIL GAS & ENERGY L. (2019); Tade Oyewunmi,
Examining the Role of Regulation in Restructuring and Development of Gas
Supply Markets in the United States and the European Union, 40 HOUS. J. INT’L 
L. 191 (2017).
67. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 18.
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108 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
gas are more complex. Unlike oil which can be kept in barrels and storage
tanks and trucked or shipped around more easily, natural gas requires 
specialized tanks and shipping or pipeline transmission to get to
predesignated creditworthy buyers or markets. Without such
predesignated arrangements, the upstream producer (which in this general
context could be the private independent producer in Oklahoma or an IOC
operating together with a NOC in Mexico or Nigeria) would likely flare,
vent, or keep it in the ground.68 
Gas storage facilities are relatively more complex and expensive to 
maintain, requiring further costs in building processing facilities or
cryogenic tanks. Operators may also use underground storage facilities
such as depleted reservoirs, aquifers, and salt caverns. In the U.S. for
example, there were 388 active storage fields reported with a design
storage capacity of 4,791 billion cubic feet by the end of 2017 spread
across 30 states.69 The U.S. natural gas pipeline network ships gas 
throughout the lower 48 states via an integrated network of interstate and
intrastate pipelines.70 
Despite the already extensive gathering, transmission, and storage
networks in the U.S., producers often face a challenge regarding how to
treat gas whenever there is a supply boom or midstream pipeline
constraint. For instance, finding available transmission pipeline capacity
or assurances on timelines within which proposed processing facilities and
pipelines will be completed and ready to ship the produced and processed
gas to designated buyers.71 The absence or delay in the available gas 
68. OYEWUNMI, supra note 1.
69. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 4, at 173.
70. Id. at 167–70. It comprises about 210 natural gas pipeline systems and
over 300,000 miles (483,000 kilometers) of transmission pipelines. The state with
the most developed natural gas pipelines by far is Texas (58,588 miles); the other
five states with the most developed gas pipelines are Louisiana (18,900 miles),
Oklahoma (18,539), Kansas (15,386), Illinois (11,900) and California (11,770).
See also AMERICAN GAS ASSOCIATION, GAS INDUSTRY MILES OF PIPELINE AND 
MAIN BY STATE AND TYPE tbl.5-3 (2017) https://www.aga.org/contentassets/71
fe352cf6fa4291a29be724ab0622b8/table5-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3SD-6K9J].
71. See Mark Passwaters, Shale Has Changed Producer-Midstream
Relationships, Industry Executives Say, S&P GLOBAL PLATTS (Feb. 7, 2020), 
https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/natural-gas/020
720-shale-has-changed-producer-midstream-relationships-industry-executives-
say [https://perma.cc/6UQ3-JZUL]; see also Harry Weber, Kinder Morgan's 
Tennessee Gas Proposes Infrastructure to Serve Plaquemines LNG, S&P GLOBAL
PLATTS (Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-
news/natural-gas/020720-kinder-morgans-tennessee-gas-proposes-infrastructure-t 
o-serve-plaquemines-lng [https://perma.cc/WS65-J45N].
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1092021] NATURAL GAS IN A CARBON-CONSTRAINED WORLD
processing and pipeline capacities is often due to commercial or regulatory
bottlenecks. The increasing number of protests against pipeline 
construction and licensing will likely worsen such delays, leaving
producers with two unwholesome options, shut-in production or vent and
flare associated gas.72 As a result, the inadequacy of transmission capacity
may lead to more upstream flaring or venting as a means of averting the
commercial implications of a total shutdown of both the oil and gas
production system.
Note also that the gas supply chain and market, especially in the U.S., 
comprises an unbundled sector in which:
(a) Upstream exploration and production operations are carried out in a 
highly competitive setting by multiple operating firms;
(b) The midstream segment involves a separate set of pipeline operators 
now subject to open access and its own unique economic and 
regulatory framework; and/or73 
(c) Multiple downstream gas distribution networks and operators 
supplying gas to residential and commercial users.74 
Understanding the dynamics and the nature of economic and property
rights held by the various operators along the value chain is useful in
clarifying some of the misconceptions about the real upstream and
downstream implications of one-sided bottlenecks created in the different
segments of the supply chain.
72. James W. Coleman, Pipelines & Power-Lines: Building the Energy
Transport Future, 80 OHIO ST. L.J. 263 (2019); see also Kristi E. Swartz,
Dominion CEO Decries Legal Hurdles for Big Energy Projects, ENERGYWIRE
NEWS (July 7, 2020), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/1063518465
[https:// perma.cc/U2B3-DHJU]; Dominion Energy and Duke Energy Cancel the
Atlantic Coast Pipeline, DOMINION ENERGY (July 5, 2020), https://news.
dominionenergy.com/2020-07-05-Dominion-Energy-and-Duke-Energy-Cancel-
the-Atlantic-Coast-Pipeline [https://perma.cc/2F5V-YCFQ]; see also Arianna
Skibell & Carlos Anchondo, With Atlantic Coast Dead, Is This Pipeline Next?,
ENERGYWIRE NEWS (July 8, 2020), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/
stories/1063524537/most_read [https://perma.cc/99BG-RJQX] (on the potential
delays and obstruction of the 300-mile Mountain Valley pipeline, which is being
built to move natural gas from northwestern West Virginia to southern Virginia).
73. Pollett, supra note 66; Oyewunmi, supra note 66.
74. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 4, at 158–63.
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110 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
A. To Block or Permit the Pipelines
The controversies that led to and followed the decision in United
States Forest Service v. Cowpasture River Preservation Association 
underscore the need for a holistic approach that appreciates the three
dimensions of energy policy concerning project development by suppliers,
rather than a one-sided and often counterproductive winner versus loser
mindset amongst stakeholders regarding the permitting or blocking of
projects.75 The Forest Service case relates to the Atlantic Coast Pipeline
designed to take gas from upstream producers in the Marcellus area in 
West Virginia to supply power plants and other users in Virginia and North
Carolina. The sponsors decided to cancel the project inter alia due to
ongoing delays, regulatory roadblocks, uncertainties, and hurdles that
impacted the economics and feasibility of the project.76 The crux of the
dispute stems from a right-of-way granted by the National Forest Service
for the pipeline sponsored by a couple of the main energy (electricity and
gas) supply utilities.77 The underground pipeline needed to “cross” the
Appalachian Trail which is part of the National Park System.78 
75. U.S. Forest Serv. v. Cowpasture River Pres. Ass’n, 140 S. Ct. 1837
(2020).
76. Dominion Energy and Duke Energy Cancel the Atlantic Coast Pipeline, 
supra note 72; Iulia Gheorghiu, Duke, Dominion Cancel $8B Atlantic Coast 
Pipeline, UTILITYDIVE (July 7, 2020), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/duke-
dominion-cancel-8b-atlantic-coast-pipeline/581028/ [https://perma.cc/42Y6-MC
6W].
77. Cowpasture River Pres. Ass’n, 140 S. Ct. 1837.
78. See Pipeline Construction Process, ATLANTIC COAST PIPELINE, https://
atlanticcoastpipeline.com/construction/construction-process.aspx [https://perma.
cc/Z573-3QU5] (last visited Jan. 10, 2021); see also Ellen M. Gilmer, Dominion’s
Atlantic Coast Pipeline Gets Supreme Court Hearing (2), BLOOMBERG LAW (Oct.
4, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/dominions-atlantic-coast
-pipeline-gets-supreme-court-hearing [https://perma.cc/EMX2-JYX6]. Gilmer
reports that “Dominion is developing the pipeline with Duke Energy Corp. and
Southern Co. Atlantic Coast would carry as much as 1.5 billion cubic feet of
natural gas per day from the Marcellus shale basin in West Virginia to customers
in North Carolina and Virginia. The pipeline company says it will save consumers
$377 million a year. Under the original proposal, a 0.1-mile segment would cross
under the hiking trail at a depth of more than 600 feet. The exit and entry points
wouldn’t be visible from the trail.”
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1112021] NATURAL GAS IN A CARBON-CONSTRAINED WORLD
Figure 4: A Snapshot of the Appalachian Area, Gas Production Fields, Existing
Transmission Lines, and Gas-Fired Power Plants from the U.S. Energy Information
Administration (EIA) Energy Mapping System (last visited January 15, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/596Z-KB9V].
The Fourth Circuit held that the U.S. Forest Service lacked authority
under the Mineral Leasing Act (MLA) to grant the right-of-way as the trail
was part of the National Park System. One of the key arguments made was
that the National Park System was "expressly exempted" from the MLA's
pipeline authorization provisions that empower the Forest Service to 
approve the right-of-way.79 Thus, the National Park Service (as overseer
of the Appalachian Trail) supposedly had the authority to grant a permit
for the pipeline to cross the trail.80 On appeal to the Supreme Court, the
pipeline project sponsors argued that the Circuit Court’s decision meant
that a 0.1-mile section of the 600-mile pipeline would need congressional
approval if found to be under the authority of the National Park Service.
There was also an argument made that the Appalachian Trail should be
regarded as under the jurisdiction of the National Forest Service because
the National Trails System Act did not change the legal status of the lands
underlying the trail, and thus, the Appalachian Trail which passes through
79. Cowpasture River Pres. Ass’n v. Forest Service, 911 F.3d 150 (4th Cir.
2018), rev’d, 140 S. Ct. 1837 (2020). See also Taylor A. Simpson, U.S. Forest
Service v. Cowpasture River Preservation Ass'n., 0 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L.
REV. (2020-2021 CASE SUMMARIES) art. 7 (2020), https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1714&context=plrlr [https://perma.cc/N6T7-VX4Y].
80. Id.
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112 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
the George Washington National Forest is part of the jurisdiction of the 
Forest Service.81 In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court overturned the U.S.
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' finding that the Forest Service could not
authorize the natural gas pipeline to pass hundreds of feet below the trail
and held inter alia that since the Park Service’s delegated jurisdiction over
the Appalachian Trail did not transform the land over which the Trail
passes into land within the National Park System, the Forest Service had
the authority to issue the special use permit.82 It was held that "[s]ometimes
a complicated regulatory scheme may cause us to miss the forest for the
trees, but at the bottom, these cases boil down to a simple proposition: A
trail is a trail, and land is land."83 While the Interior Department held a
limited easement for establishing and administering the Appalachian Trail,
the land itself remained "federal lands" under the jurisdiction of the Forest
Service.84 
The developers of the pipeline had argued that upholding the Fourth
Circuit's ruling would create an impenetrable barrier to natural gas
development on the East Coast, while the environmental groups opposing
the project maintained that the National Park Service, which is governed
by a stricter land conservation mandate than the Forest Service, is
responsible for administering the scenic trail and that pipeline construction 
on federal lands adjacent to the trail is therefore barred. Some 
conservationists joined the dispute together with a group of states
(particularly Delaware, New York, and Massachusetts).85 These groups 
opposed the appeal and claimed that the pipeline would negatively impact
the environment, aesthetics, and economic factors associated with the
Trail and that there was no real justification for granting the right-of-way 
since gas demand is not expected to increase in the target markets.86 
Conversely, the pipeline sponsors contended in the suit that to avoid the
stated environmental and aesthetic impacts to the Appalachian Trail, the
pipeline was designed to be more than 600 feet below and more than a
half-mile away from each side of the Trail and Parkway.87 
81. Cowpasture River Pres. Ass’n, 140 S. Ct. 1837.
82. Id.; see also Simpson, supra note 79.
83. Cowpasture River Pres. Ass’n, 140 S. Ct. at 1846.
84. Id.
85. Juan Carlos Rodriguez, States Tells Justices $7B Pipeline Can't Cross 
Trail, LAW360 (Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1237115/states-
tells-justices-7b-pipeline-can-t-cross-trail.
86. Id.
87. Id. More than 22,000 miles of pipelines and electric transmission lines 
have been safely operated through the national forests for decades.
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For the sake of argument, if the Supreme Court had affirmed the
Circuit Court’s decision, the sponsors of the pipeline would have needed
to get congressional approval for crossing the Trail, which would add an
additional layer of politicization and costs. Since the Supreme Court
overturned the lower court’s decision and the right-of-way granted by the
Forest Service was deemed appropriate, a lot of project planning and gas
delivery contracting and arrangements would have been required as well
as potential downstream energy planning, regulation, and policy
implications for the respective states and end-use markets involved, while
the environmental groups were also promising to continue opposing the
project.
For this Article, there are useful questions worth highlighting,
especially given similar disputes and issues trailing similar projects across
the country. First, was there really a substantial energy policy justification
for the pipeline? Second, to what extent would such energy policy
justification fit into the environmental policy dimension? Is it reasonable
to consider the potential for the pipeline to help in reducing gas flaring and
venting that could arise upstream as well as enable a greater switch from
coal to gas downstream? Are there plausible energy supply reliability and
affordability benefits the pipeline could enhance to the benefit of
downstream consumers and designated markets in Virginia and North
Carolina even in a carbon-neutral or zero-carbon world? Will the potential
impacts claimed by those opposed to the pipeline crossing the Trail
outweigh the benefits or is it just a question of killing or refusing to allow
gas pipelines for any possible reason? And what concrete steps and
decisions can the project sponsors and relevant institutions take
throughout the lifecycle of the pipeline project, i.e., from construction to
decommissioning and reclamation phases to allay the fears of
environmental, health, and safety harm and prevent the potential negative
impacts? Lastly, how “conciliatory” was the process that led to the initial
grant of a right-of-way by the Forest Service, and to what extent were the
potential complainants and environmental groups and institutions such as
the Park Service involved? A full consideration of these questions is
beyond the scope of this Article. However, in furtherance of the aims of
this Article, it is useful to examine some energy market and policy issues
about Virginia and North Carolina which were the target destination for
the gas volumes that were to be delivered via the pipeline.
B. More or Less Gas for Virginia and North Carolina
The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) reports that in
2018, 53% of Virginia's electricity net generation was gas-fired, while
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114 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
zero-carbon nuclear power provided almost 31%, and carbon-intensive
coal fueled about 10%, while renewable resources (mostly biomass),
supplied nearly 7%.88 Virginia is a major export hub for coal, even though
local coal power plants continue to shut down nationally as discussed
earlier. There certainly are energy capacity and reliability gaps to be filled
if decarbonization means less coal and gas. Notably, states such as
Virginia are pushing ahead with legal and policy initiatives to decarbonize
electricity generation by boosting cleaner renewables. Instruments such as
renewable energy portfolio standards and the Grid Transformation and
Security Act of 2018 (GTSA) have been deployed.89 However, as the
transition unfolds, it is important to understand what systems are ideal for
the various forms of electric power generation, i.e. baseload, intermediate,
and peak loads.90 
Considering the current mix of available technologies, including the
variability and reliability constraints of renewables like solar and wind, it
88. Virginia State Energy Profile, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://
www.eia.gov/state/print.php?sid=VA [https://perma.cc/2KCR-MRZA] (last
updated Oct. 15, 2020).
89. The GTSA was enacted on March 9, 2018 to facilitate an additional 5,000
MW of utility-scale electric generating facilities powered by solar and wind
energy in the public interest, along with up to an additional 500 MW of non-utility
scale solar or wind generating facilities, including rooftop solar installations. The 
law also aims at encouraging electric distribution grid transformation projects and
facilitating the integration of renewable generation resources into the energy
systems of the energy utilities. See Dominion Energy, Virginia Electric and Power
Company’s Report of Its Integrated Resource Plan, Before the Virginia State
Corporation Commission and North Carolina Utilities Commission (Public 
Version Case No. PUR-2018-00065 Docket No. E-100, Sub 157, May 1, 2018).
Virginia’s voluntary RPS goal encourages investor-owned utilities to acquire an
average of 15% renewable energy sources in calendar year 2025. See Virginia
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency, N.C. CLEAN ENERGY TECH. CTR.,
https://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/va [https://perma.cc/L4P4-6LJP] 
(last visited Jan. 24, 2021).
90. Robert Walton, Additional Gas Capacity, Baseload Generation 'Critical' 
to Maintaining Reliability: DOE Analysis, UTILITYDIVE (Mar. 4, 2020),
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/additional-gas-capacity-baseload-generation-
critical-to-maintaining-reli/573423/ [https://perma.cc/NU94-SSC5]; Additional
Pipeline Capacity and Baseload Power Generation Needed To Secure Electric
Grid, NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LABORATORY (Feb. 20, 2020), https://
netl.doe.gov/node/9516 [https://perma.cc/8HTM-Q6L3]; NAT’L ENERGY TECH.
LAB., RELIABILITY, RESILIENCE, AND THE ONCOMING WAVE OF RETIRING
BASELOAD UNITS, VOLUME II-A: CASE STUDY: ORGANIZED MARKETS OF THE
EASTERN INTERCONNECTION (2019), https://www.netl.doe.gov/projects/files/
Vol%20IIA%20-%20Markets_Case_ Study.pdf [https://perma.cc/33W4-Z96U].
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1152021] NATURAL GAS IN A CARBON-CONSTRAINED WORLD
can be argued that such systems are only suitable for intermediate and peak
load generation rather than baseload. Thus, in resolving the energy
trilemma, natural gas and nuclear generation would arguably be better
options to meet capacity requirements and demand for base-load and 
intermediate-load facilities.91 The long and cumbersome licensing and 
regulatory requirements for adding new nuclear facilities creates several
drawbacks for the nuclear energy option. Thus, in an ideal scenario, 
natural gas power generation could meet the demands for reliability,
efficiency, and relatively less or low-carbon-emissions generation systems
compared to what would be if utilities continued to use coal. This is
especially true if there is already a considerable number of existing
pipelines and gas-fired generation facilities as shown in Figure 4 above.
The alternative would be to face the challenge of building new systems
that may be more expensive, subject to regulatory delays, and factor in a
comprehensive plan to account for energy storage, reliability, or safety
issues. Also, investing in the right carbon capturing or emission curtailing
technologies for a gas-fired plant or curbing fugitive emissions, addressing
communal impacts along the gas supply value chain would seem to be a
more rational choice or trade-off from the energy policy trilemma
purview.92 
91. Power generation takes three basic forms: (i) Base-load capacity
generators- operated continuously to meet customer demand. These units have 
high capital costs but the lowest operating costs because they are in continuous
use. Base-load plants are most often nuclear powered, gas- or coal-fired. (ii) 
Intermediate load plants are used as demand rises such as gas-fired. (iii) When
demand is highest, “peak-load” generators (with low capital costs and high
operating costs because of their intermittent use) are brought into operation. There
must be a real-time balance between the supply of generated power and demand
constantly. As the energy transition unfolds, it is becoming increasingly difficult
to have enough base-load generation to meet constant and assured demand, and
enough peaking capacity to meet occasional demand increases without having too
much excess (and costly) capacity, i.e., unused generating capacity, at the peak.
In order to rapidly accommodate fluctuating demand, natural gas-fired plants,
which have faster start up times but typically higher fuel costs, are activated
gradually for peaking and intermediate demands. Coal and nuclear plants, which
can take up to 12 or more hours to start, are most effective at satisfying base-load
demands. See JOSEPH TOMAIN & RICHARD CUDAHY, ENERGY LAW IN A 
NUTSHELL 382–83 (3d ed. 2016); U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, THE UNITED STATES
ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY PRIMER 12–13 (July 2015).
92. According to the Atlantic Coast Pipeline project company, the 600-mile
underground pipeline will originate in West Virginia, travel through Virginia with
a lateral extending to Chesapeake, VA, and then continue south into eastern North
Carolina, ending in Robeson County. Two additional, shorter laterals will connect
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116 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
In Virginia, the prospects of renewables are growing considering the
state has established a voluntary renewable portfolio standard (RPS)
program to encourage investor-owned utilities to procure a portion of the
electricity sold in Virginia from “clean” renewable energy resources.93 The
RPS goal is for 15% of the base year 2007 sales to come from eligible
renewable energy sources by 2025.94 As pointed out in Dominion Energy’s
IRP highlighting the GTSA it can be argued that there is a substantial
to two Dominion Energy electric generating facilities in Brunswick and
Greensville Counties. The proposed route was developed after more than three
years of extensive study and meaningful engagement with landowners and
communities—all with the goal of finding the best route with the least possible
impact on landowners and the environment. The pipeline’s main customers are 
five of the largest public utilities in the region and these utilities provide home
heating, electricity and industrial power to millions of homes, businesses, schools
and hospitals across Virginia and North Carolina. The utilities are said to need
new, lower-cost supplies of natural gas to generate cleaner electricity, heat the 
homes of a growing population and power new industries like manufacturing. The
pipelines serving our region are fully tapped and unable to keep up with consumer
demand.
93. In 2007, Virginia’s General Assembly established incentives to
implement a RPS program. Consequently, Virginia investor-owned utilities (IOU)
provide reports regarding overall generation of renewable energy and advances in
renewable generation technology. In VA. ELEC. & POWER CO. D/B/A DOMINION
ENERGY VA., ANNUAL REPORT TO THE STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION ON 
RENEWABLE ENERGY (2019), https://scc.virginia.gov/getdoc/85b96cfe-acab-
4f9f-b8d1-61d2810b431b/dev_renew_19.pdf [https://perma.cc/DEH5-4T7V],
Dominion for instance reports on how and to what extent it meets the approved
RPS plan and commitments. See Renewable Energy Portfolio Standards, VA. ST.
CORP. COMM’N, https://scc.virginia.gov/pages/Renewable-Energy-Portfolio-
Standards [https://perma.cc/3PNK-NH4G]. Virginia's legislature passed H.B.
1526 in April 2020, which requires the development of RPS for electric utilities
and suppliers. In particular, it requires Phase II Utilities to generate 100% of their
power from renewable sources by 2045 and Phase I Utilities to generate 100% of
their power from renewable sources by 2050. See Renewable Portfolio Standard, 
N.C. CLEAN ENERGY TECH. CTR., https://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program
/detail/22133 [https://perma.cc/ AR28-622A] (last updated Aug. 27, 2020).
94. Virginia State Energy Profile, supra note 88; See Virginia Renewable
Energy and Energy Efficiency, supra note 89 (stating as follows, “From 2021-
2024, a Phase I and Phase II Utility may use RECs from any renewable energy
facility. Renewable energy facilities, as defined by Virginia law, are energy
derived from wind, sunlight, biomass, falling water, energy from waste, landfill 
gas, municipal solid waste, geothermal power, and wave motion. Renewable
energy sources also include the proportion of electric or thermal energy from a
facility that comes from the co-firing of biomass . . .”).
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1172021] NATURAL GAS IN A CARBON-CONSTRAINED WORLD
appetite for additional energy resources falling under the definition of
‘renewables’ such as utility-scale and non-utility scale solar and wind
energy. Looking ahead, the development and integration of such clean
energy systems into existing networks and portfolios would be expected.95 
As renewable energy utilization grows, it is important to maintain the grid
and off-grid energy supply reliability, affordability, and security of supply.
The requirements for reliability when variable sources are increasing
means that there must be more investments in advanced storage facilities,
capacity adequacy, and system planning. This is especially so if gas-fired 
plants that currently supply most of the state’s electricity are forced to shut
down due to inadequate fuel (gas) supply which may arise if projects are
delayed or become prohibitively uneconomic to complete.
Currently, Virginia ranks number twenty-eight in the U.S. in terms of
the Average Retail Price (cents/kWh) of Electricity to Residential users at
$12.39, while the state is ranked number thirteen in the U.S. in terms of
Natural Gas Residential Prices ($/thousand cubic feet) at $18.71.96 A
reduction in gas supply when demand remains constant or is on the rise
could lead to a corresponding increase in the pass-through-costs and then
the price of gas to power and residential purposes. This is especially
important for a state in which natural gas already plays a key role in
electricity and energy uses. Thus, shortages and inadequacy of electricity
generation capacity or supplies of reliable energy (electricity and heat) will
likely harm prices consumers have to pay, especially if the scaling-up of
alternative renewable energy sources is still unable to catch up at the
required time and scale to meet energy and capacity adequacy
requirements. In North Carolina, even though there was considerable
growth in renewables (i.e. solar) in electricity generation in 2018, the trend
of its existing generation mix is somewhat similar to Virginia considering
the significant share of natural gas, nuclear, and coal as of 2018.97 As more
95. Dominion Energy, supra note 89.
96. Rankings: Natural Gas Residential Prices, October 2019, U.S. ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/state/rankings/?sid=NC#/series/28 [https://
perma.cc/GW3Y-QVED].
97. North Carolina State Profile and Energy Estimates, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/state/?sid=NC [https://perma.cc/LX8F-XTP3] (last
updated Nov. 19, 2020). In 2018, natural gas fueled the largest share of North
Carolina's electricity generation, surpassing nuclear power for the first time.
Natural gas accounted for 33% of state generation and nuclear power contributed
31%. In 2018, North Carolina ranked second after California in its amount of
installed solar power generating capacity with more than 4,100 megawatts. North
Carolina ranks 30th in the US in terms of Average Retail Price of Electricity to
Residential Sector, October 2019 (cents/kWh) at $12.07. The state ranks 7th in
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118 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
states continue to drive the growth of cleaner and zero-carbon renewable
sources through policies such as the RPS, utilities will continue to invest
in a growing share of renewables as long as they can meet demand in a
reasonable, affordable manner, while also meeting the sustainability of
supply objectives through informed planning and investments. These three
dimensions of energy policy should not be considered as mutually
exclusive as stated earlier.
In Texas, which is the leading oil and gas producing state in the U.S.
for example, while the production and supply of gas from the Permian 
basin has increased, so has the problem of gas flaring and venting. The rise
in gas flaring and venting in Texas has been attributed to the
ineffectiveness of the permitting process and the failure of the relevant
institutions.98 There is also the usual argument of the inadequacy of
pipeline and gathering capacity. The growth in production from associated
gas fields has environmental impacts on the one hand. On the other, the
market-based paradigm of the gas and electricity markets in Texas also
allowed zero-carbon renewable wind energy to surpass coal-fired
generation and nuclear for electricity and energy over the past couple of
years.99 
the U.S. in terms of the Natural Gas Residential Prices for 2018 which averaged
$21.91 ($/thousand cu ft).
98. Colin Leyden & Scott Anderson, To Fix Flaring, Railroad Commission 
Must Tackle the Incentive Problem, ENVTL. DEF. FUND (May 29, 2020), http://
blogs.edf.org/energyexchange/2020/05/29/to-fix-flaring-railroad-commission-must-
tackle-the-incentive-problem/ [https://perma.cc/MPK6-CZ4A]; Colin Leyden, Texas
Oil and Gas Regulators Offer a Weak Fix to Flaring, ENVTL. DEF. FUND (Aug. 26,
2020), http://blogs.edf.org/ energyexchange/2020/08/26/texas-oil-and-gas-regulators-
offer-a-weak-fix-to-flaring/ [https://perma.cc/7AFM-XK5K].
99. See Texas State Energy Profile, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
https://www.eia.gov/state/print.php?sid=TX [https://perma.cc/FWX9-RYZ9] (last 
updated Mar. 19, 2020). Although natural gas-fired power plants supplied almost
half of the state's net electricity generation in 2017 and exceeded that share in 2018,
more than 5,000 megawatts of Texas coal-fired generating capacity was retired in
2018 alone, while wind-powered generation has rapidly increased in the state since
the first reported utility-scale generation in 2010. Thus, Texas currently leads the
nation in wind-powered generation and produced one-fourth of all the U.S. wind
powered electricity in 2017. Texas wind turbines have produced more electricity
than both of the state's nuclear power plants since 2014.
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1192021] NATURAL GAS IN A CARBON-CONSTRAINED WORLD
C. From Upstream Gas to Supply Networks
Natural gas pipeline systems include gathering lines, feeder lines,
transmission pipelines, and distribution lines.100 The distribution lines,
which are most common in the downstream segment, move gas to the
residential, commercial, industrial, and power generation end-users.101 
The typical regulatory and operational life cycles consist of the planning
phase, construction phase, operation, and maintenance phase,
decommissioning and abandonment, and reclamation phases. Protracted
fights over rights-of-way and/or banning new development of
transmission and distribution lines, within a particular locality or state as
discussed above, could have significant unintended consequences
upstream and downstream. Especially when such pipeline and gathering
systems are necessary to reduce upstream flaring and venting on one hand
and also to supply and support downstream baseload and intermediate
power generation capacity, space heating, or industrial processes on the
other hand.
To decarbonize while maintaining a balanced energy policy approach,
it would perhaps be less acrimonious for all stakeholders to work through
the existing market systems, integrated resource planning of extant
utilities, forecasting models and cost allocation, and regulatory
frameworks.102 Apart from the potential unintended consequence of
flaring and venting of gas resources that cannot be commercially utilized
in real-time while avoidable pipeline conflicts and bottlenecks persist,
there could also be unintended consequences downstream, such as
suspending investments in a less-carbon-intensive gas-fired plant. Such 
problems may include utilities that had planned to receive gas deliveries
as these utilities may have to resort to more carbon-intensive coal-plants
or less reliable energy systems to meet baseload and intermediate load
capacity demands. They may also impact end-user prices, at least for the
time being, while zero-carbon alternatives become cost-competitive and
develop.
100. Pollett, supra note 66.
101. Id.
102. See LeRoy Paddock & Karyan San Martano, Energy Supply Planning in
a Distributed Energy Resources World, in INNOVATION IN ENERGY LAW AND
TECHNOLOGY: DYNAMIC SOLUTIONS FOR ENERGY TRANSITIONS 371–91 (Donald
Zillman et al. eds., 2018).
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1. The Legal, Policy, and Regulatory Dynamics
In the U.S., private landowners have absolute or qualified ownership
and property rights to oil and gas in situ, subject to the rule of capture.103 
Thus, oil and gas operations on privately owned land are governed by
leasing arrangements between operators (lessees) and private landowners
(lessors) in which the latter transfers non-possessory interests to the
operator or lessee to mine, produce, and “freely” dispose of oil and gas
resources. The property rights and inherent economic interests
consequently created are also supported and defined by a framework of
common law principles and judicial decisions involving property,
contracts, and torts.104 The scope of the structure of property rights, rules,
and contractual issues is further impacted by state conservation legislation
and federal statutes. Accordingly, to figure out which institutions govern
particular operations and what rules apply in the context of a particular
production lease or supply pipeline project’s permit, it is important to
distinguish activities from private-owned land and resources from
publicly-owned resources on state/federal lands. The federal government
owns about 30% of the land area making up the United States.105 Such 
federal lands are mostly within the territories of the western states and
Alaska, as well as offshore in the Outer Continental Shelf.106 The coastal
states typically own the first three miles offshore; thus, operations and
resources beyond that are exclusively under the federal jurisdiction subject
to the rules of international maritime boundary delimitations such as those
applicable in continental shelves and exclusive economic zones.107 
103. M. K. Woodward, Ownership of Interests in Oil and Gas, 26 OHIO ST. L.
REV. J. 353, 369 (1965); Bruce M. Kramer & Owen L. Anderson, The Rule of
Capture – An Oil and Gas Perspective, 35 ENVTL. L. 899, 954 (2005).
104. JOEL EISEN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 149–52 (4th ed. 2015); Woodward, supra note 103. See also
Keith B. Hall, Implied Covenants and the Drafting of Oil and Gas Leases, 7 LSU
J. ENERGY L. & RESOURCES 401 (2019) (examining how the law of contract and
implied contract rules have influenced the development of oil and gas and
leasing).
105. CAROL HARDY VINCENT ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42346,
FEDERAL LAND OWNERSHIP: OVERVIEW AND DATA (2020).
106. Id.
107. MARC HUMPHRIES & ROBERT PIROG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40645,
U.S. OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS RESOURCES: PROSPECTS AND PROCESSES (2012).
State jurisdiction is typically limited to three nautical miles seaward of the 
baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. However, the 
state jurisdiction off the Gulf Coast of Florida and Texas extends nine nautical
miles and for Louisiana, three imperial nautical miles. Federal jurisdiction
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1212021] NATURAL GAS IN A CARBON-CONSTRAINED WORLD
Several federal agencies, such as BLM, implement federal laws and
requirements regarding oil and gas development and production on federal
lands, while each state in which oil and gas are produced has one or more
regulatory agencies that administer state laws and regulations. State laws
apply on federal lands except when they are preempted by federal law.
Accordingly, the drilling, completion, and production operations of oil and
gas on federal lands are subject to both federal and state regulations.
However, if for instance, the requirements of state regulation are more
stringent than those of federal regulation, the operator will comply with
both the state and the federal regulation by meeting the more stringent state 
requirements.108 Concerning tribal lands, the U.S. federal laws apply to oil
and gas drilling, completion, and production operations.109 Thus, operators 
on tribal lands will comply with both tribal and federal regulations by
making sure that they comply with the stricter of those rules. Regardless
of any difference in operational regulations, operators on federal lands
must comply with all federal, state, and local permitting and reporting
requirements. On Indian lands, they must comply with all federal and tribal
permitting and reporting requirements.110 
The U.S. Congress has the ultimate constitutional authority over the
public lands and, accordingly, created a system for granting rights or
licenses in federal lands under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 and Title
V of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976.111 The
inherent “economic” interests and “property” rights conveyed in the oil
and gas lease between the lessor and the lessee concerning the discovered
and produced oil and gas resources arguably lies at the heart of the
industry’s structure and transactions. The value of such interests and its
assignment is reflected in concepts such as bonuses and royalties paid to
the lessor and the non-possessory rights to enter the defined land, find and 
take-away, and freely dispose of (“sell” or make a reasonable profit) the
energy resource conveyed to the lessee. Hindrances and encumbrances to
extends, typically, 200 nautical miles seaward of the baseline from which the
breadth of the territorial sea is measured. See also ADAM VANN, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R40175, WIND ENERGY: OFFSHORE PERMITTING (2012).
108. See U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR
THE FINAL RULE TO RESCIND OR REVISE CERTAIN REQUIREMENTS OF THE 2016
WASTE PREVENTION RULE 26–30 (2018).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, in JAMES A. HOLTKAMP, RIGHTS OF ACCESS
AND SURFACE USE (1984); DAVID M. LINDAHL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
IB82050, LEASING OF ENERGY AND MATERIAL RESOURCES ON FEDERAL LANDS
(1982).
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122 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
such rights and economic interests to freely dispose of discovered and
produced oil and gas as a result of regulation or politically motivated
activism could easily lead to claims of “expropriation” or “regulatory
takings.” Conversely, profit-centered actions carried out according to
economic and property rights may lead to operators not taking due and just
cognizance of the environmental externalities and footprints their
operations create.112 This is arguably the case in Texas and the Permian
basin where gas flaring has increased sporadically in tandem with gas
production.
It is important to preserve and protect economic and property rights
while ensuring an affordable and secure supply of energy. However,
regulation should also seek to fulfill the third dimension of energy policy,
i.e. preventing or curbing the negative environmental impacts of
operations in the interests of public health and safety. If regulation goes
too far it could be seen as “a taking” or otherwise detrimental to the
development of industry and private enterprise. The case of WildEarth
Guardians v. Zinke113 exemplifies the growing trend of holding regulatory
institutions and operators to higher standards in balancing the pursuit of
energy abundance by granting oil and gas exploration and production
leases on public land and the need to consider environmental and indirect
climatic implications of such awards. In WildEarth Guardians, the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia barred oil and gas drilling on
public lands in Wyoming, finding that the BLM failed to “sufficiently”
consider climate change when authorizing the leases.114 The court’s
decision signified the growing viewpoint that such “public-centered”
environmental or climate change impact issues should be considered in
granting rights to mine, produce, and dispose of oil and gas from public
lands. The converse view is that such factors should not be considered
“sufficient” grounds to enjoin or deter the awards of oil and gas leases, as
long as there is a reasoned assessment of its environmental impacts vis-à-
vis its costs and benefits by the designated institutions, i.e. BLM.115 The 
112. See Regulatory Takings, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell
.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-5/regulatory-takings [https://perma.cc/PHS4-
33XL] (last visited Jan. 10, 2021) (discussing the regulation and powers of the state
to hinder or encumber the use of economic and property rights); Alexandra B. Klass,
Takings and Transmission, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1079 (2013).
113. See WildEarth Guardians v. Zinke, 368 F. Supp. 3d 41 (D.D.C. 2019).
114. Id.
115. Id. In August 2016, WildEarth asked the Federal District Court in D.C. to
vacate authorizations for almost 400 oil and gas leases on public lands granted by
the BLM in in three states because BLM had not complied with the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) regarding the assessment of direct, indirect,
350308-LSU_EL_9-1_Text.indd  127 2/25/21  8:41 AM







   





    
    
  









    









   
     
      
    
 
    
     
 
  
   
1232021] NATURAL GAS IN A CARBON-CONSTRAINED WORLD
need for such a reasoned assessment of environmental impacts vis-à-vis 
its costs and benefits underscores the pivotal role of regulatory institutions
in balancing the energy policy trilemma.
The D.C. Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that BLM was 
required to use certain protocols, i.e. the “social cost of carbon” and the
“global carbon budget” to quantify climate change impacts of oil and gas
operations arising from the leases.116 Interestingly, the court did not vacate 
the leasing decisions but enjoined BLM from authorizing new oil and gas
drilling on the leases while the Agency conducts its additional
“environmental assessments” and “analysis” of the indirect climatic
impacts. BLM, later on, carried out the supplemental environmental
assessment for the oil and gas leases, and thus, on July 19, 2019, the court
denied a request by WildEarth to enjoin the BLM from authorizing new
oil and gas drilling on Colorado and Utah leases.117 The push for
considering environmental and climatic impacts of local U.S. gas supply
and commercialization projects has also spread towards export pipelines
and LNG projects.118 
and cumulative climate effects associated with the leases. Thus, the D.C. Court
was asked to enjoin BLM from approving drilling applications until it complies
with NEPA. Subsequently, three oil and gas trade associations intervened in 
relation to leases granted in Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming. In March 19, 2019,
the Court ruled that BLM did not sufficiently consider the climate change effects
of oil and gas leasing in its National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) review
for 282 lease sales covering more than 303,000 acres in Wyoming. It found that
BLM did not critically consider drilling-related and downstream greenhouse gas
emissions associated with the leases and that BLM failed to “sufficiently compare
those emissions to regional and national emissions.” With respect to downstream
emissions from combustion of oil and gas, the court found that such emissions
were indirect effects of the oil and gas leasing under the applicable “heightened”
causation standard. Regarding cumulative effects, the court ruled that BLM’s
refusal to quantify greenhouse gas emissions as required by NEPA rendered its
cumulative impacts analysis inadequate.
116. Id.
117. Id.; Nicole A. Jensen, U.S. District Court Decision Regarding Drilling on
Federal Land, 8 INST. FOR ENERGY L.: THE ENERGY DISPATCH 10-12 (2020).
118. D. Ryan Cordell, Jr., Sierra Club v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission: The D.C. Circuit Upholds FERC’s Regional NEPA Analysis for
Freeport Projects; Punts on Issue of LNG Export Environmental Impacts, 30 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 123 (2016). In the Sierra Club v. FERC (Freeport) case, two
environmentalist groups claimed that the FERC did not adequately consider the
indirect environmental effects of a possible increase in domestic natural gas 
production which would be induced by the approved Freeport LNG export
Projects as well as the cumulative environmental impacts of the Freeport Projects
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2. International Developments and Gas Commercialization
Outside the U.S. and Canada, most other jurisdictions adopt a
domanial resource ownership system in which the property rights in and
ownership of oil and gas or mineral resources in situ are vested in the state 
and managed by the host government.119 Consequently, the host
government grants concessions, licenses, or contracts with an
administrative nature and participates directly in operations through the
NOC.120 Upon establishing a framework for exploration and production,
the relevant parties enter into transportation and supply agreements
between a producer(s) and a pipeline company and/or downstream buyer
which establishes further entitlements, obligations, and interests along the
value chain.121 Ideally, the property rights and interests awarded via the
concession or license, permit the holder to find, produce, take-away, and
freely dispose of oil and gas within the defined acreage or parcel of land
and subject to the applicable petroleum laws, policy, and regulations of the
host country.122 
As depicted in Figure 5 below, the typical gas supply production and
supply value chain consists of gas producers in the upstream segment who
hold a license to explore, find and produce gas, which is thereon, gathered
through small-diameter pipelines (gathering lines) from oil and/or gas
fields;123 the gas molecules then go through the processing facilities to 
remove water and impurities, compressed to boost its pressure to enable it
to flow into large transmission pipelines in the midstream segment, owned
and operated by gas pipeline firms and then transported to storage,
distribution, or marketing centers downstream.
in light of other proposed or authorized natural gas export projects across the 
country.
119. YINKA OMOROGBE, OIL AND GAS LAW IN NIGERIA (2003); Tade
Oyewunmi, Natural Gas Exploration and Production in Nigeria and
Mozambique: Legal and Contractual Issues, 13 OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 1 (2015);
Lanre Aladeitan, Ownership and Control of Oil, Gas, and Mineral Resources in
Nigeria: Between Legality and Legitimacy, 38 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 159 (2012).
120. See OYEWUNMI, supra note 1, at 15–20.
121. Peter Roberts & Ruchdi Maalouf, Contractual Isssues in International
Gas Trade: LNG – The Key to the Golden Age of Gas, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK 
ON INTERNATIONAL ENERGY LAW 329–57 (Kim Talus ed., 2014). In most cases
the NOC disposes of its share of produced gas through a subsidiary national gas
transmission and distribution company.
122. OYEWUNMI, supra note 1, at 15–20.
123. Oyewunmi, supra note 119; SMITH ET AL., supra note 44, at 1022–1101.
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1252021] NATURAL GAS IN A CARBON-CONSTRAINED WORLD
Figure 5: Gas Production and Commercialization Supply Chain [https://perma.cc/596Z-
KB9V].
The main avenues to commercializing produced gas and by-products
of processing, such as Natural Gas Liquids (NGLs) and LNG, is via the
domestic market and exports via LNG to international buyers.124 
Depending on the objectives of the parties involved, the processed gas
could be sold to the domestic market in the country where the production
took place or exported via LNG or cross-border pipelines. In the U.S., the
exportation of gas through LNG is subject inter alia to the regulatory
oversight of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and
includes the assessment of environmental impacts as mentioned earlier.125 
Gas processing and midstream activities could also be designed to
produce NGLs and Liquefied Petroleum Gas, or cooking gas carried to
residential and commercial areas through distribution pipelines and other
small-scale systems. Recently, there has been an increase in the
deployment of offshore Floating LNG facilities, while Floating Storage
and Regasification Units are now very popular to import LNG and regasify
it into a usable form in countries with limited access to cross-border
pipelines and little or no domestic gas resources.126 Over the past three
124. See MIKE FULWOOD & THIERRY BROS, FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR LNG
DEMAND IN GHANA (2018), https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content
/uploads/2018/01/Future-prospects-for-LNG-demand-in-Ghana-Insight-26.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G538-RWWC]; EZEKIEL ADESINA ET AL., UNDERSTANDING
NATURAL GAS AND LNG OPTIONS (2016).
125. Cordell, supra note 118.
126. Id.; Susan L. Sakmar, Global Gas Markets: The Role of LNG in the 
Golden Age of Gas and the Globalization of LNG Trade, 35 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 655 
( 2013); Roberts & Maalouf, supra note 121.
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126 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
decades, these commercialization options and global gas supply trends
have been enhanced by more gas discoveries; structural reforms leading
to better economic regulation and pricing in major consuming markets
globally; the policy-driven quest to reduce carbon-intensive and air-
polluting coal.127 
D. Sources of Emissions From the Gas Patch
Figure 6 below portrays the segments of the natural gas supply chain
and the main sources of methane emissions from each sub-sector. As
discussed earlier, methane is the chief constituent of natural gas, and it is
a potent GHG. However, it stays in the atmosphere for a much shorter
period compared to carbon dioxide.128 Thus, curbing or eliminating
methane emissions is widely regarded as a promising means of tackling
near-term global warming while the necessary long-term cuts in CO2 
emissions are implemented. 129 
127. Compared to 2017, global gas consumption rose by an estimated 4.6% in
2018, its highest annual growth rate since 2010. See Global Gas Security Review, 
INT’L ENERGY AGENCY (Sept. 2019), https://www.iea.org/reports/global-gas-
security-review-2019 [https://perma.cc/59J3-SC8N]; Golden Rules for a Golden
Age of Gas, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY (Oct. 2013), https://www.iea.org/reports
/golden-rules-for-a-golden-age-of-gas [https://perma.cc/66X6-FNVY].
128. The atmospheric lifespan of methane is reported to be for about 12 years
after it has been emitted, while carbon dioxide is estimated to have an atmospheric
lifetime of 50-200 years. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 18; Ehrman,
supra note 25.
129. Ehrman, supra note 25.
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1272021] NATURAL GAS IN A CARBON-CONSTRAINED WORLD
Figure 6: Gas Supply and Methane Emission Sources130 [https://perma.cc/596Z-KB9V].
Natural gas distribution systems recorded the lowest rate of emissions,
and there was a significant reduction in emissions reported from the 1990-
2018 period.131 The gas transmission and storage segment comes next and
then the exploration segments of the gas supply chain. Methane emissions
from oil (petroleum) production systems have decreased by five percent
since 1990, due to declining emissions from tanks, hydraulically fractured
oil well workovers, and offshore platforms.132 Conversely, CO2 emissions
from petroleum production systems remained relatively high with the
main sources arising from the flaring of associated gas, oil tanks with
flares, and miscellaneous production flaring. 133 
Regarding gas production systems, including gathering and boosting
facilities,134 the reported emissions were mostly from production wells and
well-site gas treatment equipment, such as dehydrators and separators.135 
In the U.S., the pattern of methane and CO2 emissions related to natural
gas systems appears in tandem with the boost in domestic oil and gas
130. Overview of the Oil and Natural Gas Industry, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/natural-gas-star-program/overview-oil-and-natural-
gas-industry [https://perma.cc/ZKQ8-QN4E] (last visited Jan. 10, 2021).
131. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 18, at 3-82.
132. Id. at 3-64.
133. Id.
134. See supra Fig. 6 (The gathering and boosting stations receive natural gas 
from production sites and transfer it via gathering pipelines to transmission
pipelines or processing facilities. Custody transfer points are typically used to
segregate sources between each segment.).
135. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 18, at 3-64.
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128 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
production, especially from associated gas fields over the past decade. The
domestic production of dry gas witnessed a 53% increase from 1990 to
2017; while methane emissions from production also increased by 62%
from 1990 to 2017.136 The main sources for the emissions are reported to 
be from pneumatic controllers,137 seemingly due to an uptick in the number
of controllers required as well as more gathering and boosting stations 
needed to enhance growing production operations and activities. The
principal sources of CO2 emissions are associated gas flaring, oil tanks
with flares, and miscellaneous production flaring.138 This trend is
attributable to some of the issues discussed earlier such as limited or
inadequate gathering and processing facilities upstream, and connecting
pipelines which may also be due to the existence of a viable wholesale
market and the downstream demand, e.g., from a gas-fired power
generator or utility. Also, there is the case of flaring to control tank
emissions and offshore flaring.139 
The highlighted trends and complexities of curbing emissions from
petroleum and natural gas systems underscore the importance of thorough
reporting and monitoring standards and rules. Such reporting requirements
would enhance the ability of an independent regulatory institution to make
informed decisions as well as the industry’s ability to efficiently invest in
the required innovative systems to curb the harmful externalities.
Emissions vary from facility to facility, thus operators may be in the
best position to develop effective solutions based on reasonable standards
of monitoring, reporting, and curtailments developed by relevant
institutions.140 Some of the identified cost-efficient approaches to
curtailing emissions include detecting and fixing equipment leaks,
deploying satellite technologies as recommended by the Oil and Gas
136. Id. (“Methane and non-combustion CO2 emissions from natural gas
systems include those resulting from normal operations, routine maintenance, and
system upsets. Emissions from normal operations include: natural gas engine and
turbine uncombusted exhaust, flaring, and leak emissions from system
components. Routine maintenance emissions originate from pipelines, equipment,
and wells during repair and maintenance activities. Pressure surge relief systems
and accidents can lead to system upset emissions.”).
137. Id. at 3-64.
138. Id. at 3-64 to 3-65.
139. Id. at 3-80 to 3-81.
140. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY SECTOR METHANE RECOVERY AND
USE: THE IMPORTANCE OF POLICY (2009). Some emissions are accidental, for
example because of a faulty seal or leaking valve, while others are deliberate,
often carried out for safety reasons or due to the design of the facility or
equipment.
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1292021] NATURAL GAS IN A CARBON-CONSTRAINED WORLD
Climate Initiative,141 and implementing reduced emissions completion
technologies (green completions) for unconventional gas wells. Another
commercial approach is to incentivize operators or third-party users to 
capture gas that would ordinarily be flared (flare gas) or vented as in the
case of Nigeria’s recent Flare Gas Commercialization Programme.142 
1. From Penalties to Commercializing Flare Gas in Nigeria
Earlier attempts at issuing penalties alongside a pronouncement of
deadlines to stop routine flaring and venting in Nigeria failed mostly due
to identifiable regulatory and institutionalized factors.143 Firstly, like many
other oil and gas-rich countries globally, the operators were more
interested in oil rather than gas. Although significant commercial interests
in gas have grown since the late 1990s, as well as domestic gas demand,144 
the domestic prices for gas supply to power were often not reflective of
reasonable and projected costs of supplying the needed volumes. As a
result, most oil and gas producers found it cheaper to flare and pay
penalties rather than invest in new processing and domestic pipelines to
supply at below-market prices. Although, there were bilateral domestic
141. OIL & GAS CLIMATE INITIATIVE, AT WORK: COMMITTED TO CLIMATE
ACTION 19 (Sept. 2018), https://oilandgasclimateinitiative.com/wp-content/up
loads/2018/09/OGCI_Report_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/BR6U-43KA].
142. Stephen Oluwaṣeun Ọkẹ, Gas Flaring in Nigeria and the Flexed Muscles 
of the 2018 Regulations: Key Implications and Investment Considerations, OIL
GAS & ENERGY L., no. 1 (2019), www.ogel.org/article.asp?key=3806 [https://
perma.cc/XAY6-HFFW].
143. The Associated Gas Re-Injection Act 1979 (‘Associated Gas Act’) 147
and the Associated Gas Reinjection (Continued Flaring of Gas) Regulations 1984
provided for exemptions to a general legal ban on gas flaring and applicable
penalties. Unfortunately, the general ban on gas flaring and the approach of
imposing penalties while announcing dates to end flaring has been ineffective
over the years. In reality, most producing fields and operators were exempted
from anti-gas flaring provisions, and the remaining fields were often subject to
insignificant penalties which made flaring more economical than building
utilization infrastructure or carrying out gas reinjection. Yinka Omorogbe, Law 
and Investor Protection in the Nigerian Natural Gas Industry, 14 J. ENERGY &
NAT. RESOURCES L. 179 (1996).
144. Although several large local industries that used natural gas could afford
to pay market-based rates, the gas-dependent power sector faced significant debt
and liquidity issues for several years which reforms and liberalization initiatives 
launched in the 2000s aimed at addressing. See Rahmattallah Poudineh & Tade
Oyewunmi, Natural Gas in Nigeria and Tanzania: Can it Turn on Lights?,
OXFORD ENERGY FORUM, Sept. 2018, at 14–20.
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130 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
wholesale supplies mostly to large buyers, industrial users, and some
power generators.145 Most of the produced and processed gas was also 
designed for export projects, such as the West African Gas Pipeline and
the Nigerian LNG Project.146 Secondly, like most other producing
countries outside the U.S., Nigeria has a NOC with a local subsidiary
responsible for gas transmission and distribution. Thus, entering into joint
ventures with the private IOCs in which the government held majority
participating interests under a joint and several liability frameworks in oil
and gas production operations makes the role of government as the 
regulator more complex. Such issues led to calls for a more independent
and well-equipped regulatory agency that could effectively carry out
environmental, health, and safety regulation.147 
In July 2018, the current Nigerian federal government issued the Flare
Gas (Prevention of Waste and Pollution) Regulations 2018 (“Flare Gas
Regulations”).148 The Flare Gas Regulations apply to all petroleum leases, 
licenses, and marginal fields in Nigeria and provide a framework aimed at
(i) protecting affected communities from the adverse effects of gas flaring;
(ii) preventing the waste of associated gas; and (iii) creating social and
economic benefits by permitting interested third-parties to gain access,
capture, and utilize gas that would otherwise be flared during oil
production operations.149 
E. Emissions From Oil and Gas Operations
The EPA reports that, in 2018, methane accounted for about 9.5
percent of total domestic U.S. GHG emissions.150 The main sources of
methane emissions include leaks from natural gas systems and the raising
145. Oyewunmi, supra note 1, at 111–71 (competitiveness and security of
supply in the Nigerian Gas-to-Power industry).
146. Id.
147. Dickson Omukoro, Environmental Degradation in Nigeria: Regulatory
Agencies, Conflict of Interest and the use of Unfettered Discretion, OIL GAS &
ENERGY L., no. 1 (2017), https://www.ogel.org/article.asp?key=3678 [https://
perma.cc/4YUV-R56D] (last visited Mar. 3, 2018).
148. See Flare Gas (Prevention of Waste and Pollution) Regulations 2018, INT’L 
ENERGY AGENCY, https://www.iea.org/policies/8675-flare-gas-prevention-of-waste-
and-pollution-regulations-2018 [https://perma.cc/74EB-F4BG] (last updated Aug. 10,
2020).
149. Oke, supra note 142; see also Nigerian Gas Flare Commercialization 
Programme, https://ngfcp.dpr.gov.ng/ [https://perma.cc/4MKF-VL8M] (last visited
Jan. 10, 2021).
150. Overview of Greenhouse Gases, supra note 20.
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1312021] NATURAL GAS IN A CARBON-CONSTRAINED WORLD
of livestock.151 Natural gas systems are the highest sources of energy-
related methane emissions, followed by coal mining and petroleum
systems when considered from 1990 to 2017. Emissions are generally
categorized into those from stationary and mobile combustion sources or
stationary and mobile non-combustion sources.152 Leaks and fugitive 
emissions from abandoned coal mines and oil and gas wells or pipelines
and valves in gas systems fall under the non-combustion stationary sources
which are present in most parts of the gas production and supply value
chain.153 Methane emissions from stationary combustion sources depend 
upon fuel characteristics, size, and vintage, along with combustion
technology, pollution control equipment, ambient environmental
conditions, and operation and maintenance practices,154 all of which may
be subject to regulatory guidelines that would ensure regular monitoring
and checks are carried out by the operators. According to the U.S. EPA’s
2019 GHG inventory report:
151. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 18, at 1-113.
152. Id. Combustion of fuels such as gasoline, diesel oil and jet fuel by
vehicles, ships, boats, agricultural and construction equipment, and airplanes, etc.
Fossil fuels are generally combusted for the purpose of producing energy and
during the process the carbon (C) stored in the fuels is oxidized and emitted as
CO2 and smaller amounts of other gases, including methane, carbon monoxide,
and non-methane volatile organic compounds (NMVOCs).
153. CTR. FOR CORP. CLIMATE LEADERSHIP, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORY GUIDANCE: DIRECT EMISSIONS FROM
STATIONARY COMBUSTION SOURCES (2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/product
ion/files/2016-03/documents/stationaryemissions_3_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6GJW-EC7L] (Oil and gas wells classified as “abandoned” may include wells that
have: (a) no recent production, and not plugged, thus could be inactive,
temporarily abandoned, shut-in, dormant, and idle; (b) no recent production and
no responsible operator; or (c) been plugged to prevent migration of gas or
fluids.).
154. Id. (Note that not all-stationary combustion sources burn fossil fuels. 
Biomass (non-fossil) fuels (e.g., forestry-derived, agriculture-derived, biomass-
derived gases) may be combusted in stationary sources independently or co-fired
with fossil fuels. Waste-derived fuels in solid, liquid, and gaseous form may be
combusted in stationary sources as well. Typical waste derived fuels include, but
are not limited to, used tires, used motor oils, municipal solid waste (MSW),
hazardous waste, landfill gas, and by-product gases. use of natural gas may result
in fugitive methane emissions from leaking gas transportation lines owned by the
organization. Storage of fuels may also result in fugitive emissions. For example,
methane is emitted from fuel storage tanks or from coal piles. Typically, these
sources are minor compared to combustion emissions, however, organizations
should account for these non-combustion sources using guidance specific to the 
fugitive emissions from their sector.)
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132 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
Methane emissions from petroleum systems are primarily
associated with onshore and offshore crude oil production, 
transportation, and refining operations. During these activities,
CH4 is released into the atmosphere as leak emissions, vented
emissions (including emissions from operational upsets), and
emissions from flaring. Carbon dioxide emissions from petroleum
systems are primarily associated with crude oil production and
refining operations.”155 
Although total methane emissions from petroleum systems in 2017
decreased by 10% compared to 1990 levels, it is noted that total CO2 
emissions recorded a significant 161% increase when compared to 1990
levels, while N2O emissions had a 77% increase compared to 1990
levels.156 
Based on these reports, it may be concluded that the decrease
witnessed between 1990 and 2017 reflects the regulatory and operational
focus on curbing methane and better technological advancements in
monitoring and dealing with the menace.157 Programs such as the Natural
Gas STAR Program established in 1993,158 the 2014 Oil & Gas Methane
Partnership,159 and the Methane Challenge Program launched in 2016
155. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 18, at 3-64.
156. Id.
157. Methane and non-combustion CO2 emissions from natural gas systems
include those resulting from normal operations, routine maintenance, and system
upsets.
158. The Natural Gas STAR Program provides a framework for voluntary 
partnership that encourages oil and natural gas companies—both domestically and 
abroad—to adopt proven, cost-effective technologies and practices that improve
operational efficiency and reduce methane emissions. See Natural Gas STAR
Program, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/natural-gas-
star-program/natural-gas-star-program [https://perma.cc/57PE-QPEQ] (last visited
Jan. 10, 2021).
159. The Climate and Clean Air Coalition (CCAC) created a voluntary
initiative to help IOCs reduce methane emission. The initiative was launched at
the UN Secretary General’s Climate Summit in New York in September 2014 and
currently includes IOCs such as BP, Ecopetrol, Eni, Equinor, Neptune Energy
International SA, Pemex, PTT, Repsol, Shell and Total. In January 2020,
participants agreed to an updated framework designed to ensure that it fosters and
encourages reporting that remains directly connected to strategic action. This
improved methane reporting has a performance element that focuses on reduction
approaches, technology advancement and policy development, aiding the oil and
gas industry in realizing deep reductions in mineral methane emissions over the
next decade in a way that is transparent to civil society and governments. See The 
CCAC Oil & Gas Methane Partnership, CLIMATE & CLEAN AIR COALITION, 
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1332021] NATURAL GAS IN A CARBON-CONSTRAINED WORLD
appear to have contributed to such a decreasing trend.160 U.S. methane 
emissions from oil and gas exploration activities decreased by 69% from
1990 to 2017, with the largest decreases coming from hydraulically
fractured gas well completions without reduced emissions completions
(RECs) or flaring.161 Although, emissions increased dramatically from
2016 to 2017; the levels of emissions were highest from 2006 to 2008.162 
Increases in CO2 emissions from exploration and production reportedly
due to increases in gas flaring as mentioned earlier is also in line with the
reported rise of gas flaring from prolific production provinces such as the
Permian Basin.163 
Natural gas liquids and various other constituents are removed in the
gas processing stage, resulting in “pipeline quality” gas, which is then
injected into the transmission system. In this segment, there are some cases
of reported incidents of fugitive emissions from compressors and
compressor seals.164 Note that gas transmission involves high pressure, 
large-diameter pipelines that transport gas through long distances from
production fields and processing areas to distribution systems or large
volume customers, such as power plants or chemical plants. As shown in
Figure 6 above, leaks from compressor stations and venting from
pneumatic controllers result in emissions during transmission, including
uncombusted engine exhaust and pipeline venting. Natural gas is also
injected and stored in underground formations or liquefied and stored in 
above-ground cryogenic tanks during periods of low demand (e.g.,
summer), and withdrawn, processed, and distributed during periods of
high demand (e.g., winter). Emissions could also arise from compressors
and dehydrators from storage units.165 
https://www.ccacoalition.org/en/activity/ccac-oil-gas-methane-partnership [https://
perma.cc/7DQJ-9TZR] (last visited Jan. 10, 2021).
160. Operators involved in the Methane Challenge Program agree to
transparently report systematic and comprehensive actions to reduce methane
emissions and be publicly recognized as leaders in reducing methane emissions
in the U.S. Doing so reduces operational risk, increases efficiency, and
demonstrates company concern for the environment, with benefits spanning from
climate change to air quality improvements to conservation of a non-renewable 
energy resource. See Methane Challenge Program, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION 
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/natural-gas-star-program/methane-challenge-
program [https://perma.cc/9AGA-AZDC] (last visited Jan. 10, 2021).
161. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 18, at 3-64.
162. Id. at 3-81.
163. See Permian Gas Flaring Reaches Yet Another High, supra note 36; 
Adams-Heard & Ngai, supra note 36.
164. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 18, at 3-81.
165. Id.
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134 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
Methane emissions from the transmission and storage sector (which
includes pipelines, storage tanks, and LNG systems) account for
approximately 20% of emissions from natural gas systems, while CO2
emissions arising from this segment accounts for 2% of the non-
combustion CO2 emissions from natural gas systems.166 It is reported that
methane emissions from the transmission and storage segment decreased
by 43% when comparing 1990 to 2017 levels. This reduction is attributed
to reduced compressor station emissions (including emissions from
compressors and leaks).167 The EPA reported increasing levels of
emissions of CO2 from LNG export terminals when comparing 1990
levels to 2017 levels, but this is perhaps as a result of the increase in the
number of LNG export activities and new build LNG export projects
during the last three to four years of the reporting period of 1990 to
2017.168 From 1990 until about 2010, the U.S. was a net importer of gas
(e.g., from countries like Nigeria) and had import LNG regasification
terminals rather than liquefaction facilities which became more prevalent
following the domestic gas production boom from 2012. There are rare
cases of emissions (perhaps through pipeline leaks) at the distribution
stage from the “city gate” stations where gas from high-pressure
transmission lines are received by local distributors and large customers
and are distributed or taken-up. In the distribution system, methane and 
CO2 emissions in 2017 were 73% lower than the 1990 levels.169 
III. GAS SUPPLY INSTITUTIONS AND REGULATION
As discussed in Part II above, the U.S. midstream processing,
transmission, and distribution segments involve several players and
operators. The market restructuring and reform efforts mainly by FERC
from the 1980s to 2000 led to the unbundling of previously vertically-
integrated gas supply firms and an open-access framework to foster
competitive wholesale markets and non-discriminatory entry and exit to 
transmission systems.170 The wholesale markets, interstate transmission, 
and cross-border facilities are regulated by FERC, while intrastate local





170. Oyewunmi, supra note 1, at 85–101; Natural Gas Regulation and Market
Disorder, 18 TULSA L.J. 619 (1983); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The State of the
Transition to Competitive Markets in Natural Gas and Electricity, 15 Energy L.J.
323 (1994).
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1352021] NATURAL GAS IN A CARBON-CONSTRAINED WORLD
level.171 The applicable prices and entry along the value chain are typically
market-based, while state public utility commissions exercise regulatory
authority over retail gas prices and are responsible for consumer
protection, natural gas facility construction, and environmental issues that
are not covered by FERC or the Department of Transportation.
A. Gas Production Boom and Electricity
The shale gas revolution created a remarkable 40% growth in
indigenous gas production in the U.S.172 Two major plausible impacts of
the production boom could be the greater inclination to flare and vent
unutilized or excess gas or the need for timely investments in gas gathering
and processing, new transmission, and storage capacity.173 Such
investments and timely project completion of the necessary infrastructure
are key to ensuring reliability in an electricity and downstream energy
market that relies significantly on natural gas.
While the U.S. became a net exporter of natural gas, domestic
consumption also reached a historic high in 2018, i.e. an 18% increase in
171. See Suedeen G. Kelly, Intrastate Natural Gas Regulation: Finding Order
in the Chaos, 9 YALE J. REG. 355 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Intrastate Natural 
Gas Regulation: An Alternative Perspective, 9 Yale J. Reg. 407 (1992).
172. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 4, at 156–57.
173. Monika U. Ehrman explains that “Often used when midstream
connections are not available, flaring is common practice in the oil and gas 
industry. Operators may employ flaring (1) during flowback, which is the period
of time in the hydraulic fracturing operation when the injected slurry of water,
proppant, and chemicals flows back through the wellbore or (2) when connection 
timelines are delayed-midstream companies can be notoriously uncertain with
regards to construction timelines. In lieu of shutting in the well (stopping
production), which delays income of saleable and more valuable hydrocarbons,
operators instead send these non-connected volumes of gas (often referred to as
"waste gas" or "flare gas") up through flare stacks, where those volumes are then
ignited and combusted. Ideally the entire volume of flare gas combusts, resulting
in the formation of carbon dioxide and water. But inefficient flaring may lead to
partial combustion and the consequent exhaust of methane and other toxics into
the atmosphere.” Monika U. Ehrman, Lights Out in the Bakken: A Review and
Analysis of Flaring Regulation and its Potential Effect on North Dakota Shale Oil 
Production, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 549, 551 (2014) (Emphasis added). Note that the
inability of midstream pipeline companies to confirm or guarantee available
pipeline capacity or completion of new pipeline projects may be due to other
issues such as political conflicts, regulatory bottlenecks, environmental activism
against pipelines, etc.
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136 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
domestic consumption from 2007 to 2017.174 The utilization of gas in the
electricity sector has been a major driving force in this regard. The
extensive network of interstate and intrastate gas pipelines and storage
systems (as depicted in Figure 7 below) also plays a major role in the
growing interconnectedness between gas production, supply, and
consumption. Unlike natural gas, electricity has a particular attribute that
makes it more complex and expensive to store for long periods. Electricity
storage requires expensive advanced technologies, such as batteries. Even
though storage technologies have been advancing in recent times, there is
still the key requirement of ensuring that generation and supply must meet
demand and consumption in real time.
Figure 7: U.S. Natural Gas Pipeline Transmission Network and Storage Facilities175 
[https://perma.cc/596Z-KB9V].
174. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 4. The main sectors in the domestic
consumption trend as at 2017 were: (i) heat and power generation (37%), (ii)
industry (23%), (iii) residential (16%), commercial and others (11%), energy
(9%), and transport (3%).
175. U.S. Energy Mapping System, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
https://www.eia.gov/state/maps.php [https://perma.cc/NCN6-T7KS] (last visited
Jan. 10, 2021). For more about the U.S. natural gas pipeline network and storage,
see Natural Gas Explained, U.S. Energy Info. Admin., www.eia.gov/energy
explained/natural-gas/natural-gas-pipelines.php [https://perma.cc/9JXF-MVHL]
(last updated Dec. 3, 2020). The US gas pipeline network is highly integrated,
moving gas volumes from upstream (onshore and offshore) sources throughout
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1372021] NATURAL GAS IN A CARBON-CONSTRAINED WORLD
Furthermore, if electricity supply depends on gas-fired generation,
then there is no denying the importance of timely, coordinated, and reliable
supplies of sufficient gas volumes to fuel the power generation capacity. 
Such guaranteed and coordinated supply will also be essential for grid and
system reliability as utilities increasingly shut down coal plants and other
conventional systems and switch to gas-fired generation and renewables,
such as solar and wind. This is even more so when such renewables depend
on seasonal, locational, and weather patterns. The decisions and choices
to invest in one or more sources of energy will have considerable
implications for the competitiveness, sustainability, or decarbonization
and security of energy supply going forward.176 
The role of the FERC, in the scheme of things, includes facilitating
efficient integration and coordination between the wholesale gas and
electricity markets, as well as interstate network transmission issues. For
example, FERC Order 809,177 Order 787,178 and Order No. 757179 
respectively underscore the growing interconnectedness and coordination
between gas and electricity supply. For instance, Order 787 underscores
the need for interstate gas pipelines and public utilities that own, operate, 
or control facilities used for the transmission of electric energy in interstate
commerce to share non-public, operational information to promote
reliability and better operational planning.180 As the share of distributed
and decentralized renewable systems increases and the need for those
systems to connect and dispose of excess energy to the existing grid and
networks grow, there is still a need to have utilities and system operators
that are viable enough to maintain and operate conventional networks.
In the medium to long-term, natural gas supply and networks are
expected to play a key role in the reliability of energy supply in the U.S.181 
the lower 48 states via interstate and intrastate pipelines, while there are also
significant cross-border pipelines between (i) U.S. and Mexico, and (ii) U.S. and 
Canada.
176. Paul Joskow, Supply Security in Competitive Electricity and Natural Gas
Markets, in UTILITY REGULATION IN COMPETITIVE MARKETS: PROBLEMS AND 
PROGRESS (Colin Robinson ed., 2007); Oyewunmi et al., supra note 24.
177. Coordination of the Scheduling Processes of Interstate Natural Gas
Pipelines and Public Utilities, 80 Fed. Reg. 46,979 (Aug. 6, 2015).
178. Communication of Operational Information between Natural Gas 
Pipelines and Electric Transmission Operators, 78 Fed. Reg. 70,163 (Nov. 22,
2013) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 38 and 18 C.F.R. pt. 284).
179. Storage Reporting Requirements of Interstate and Intrastate Natural Gas 
Companies, 77 Fed. Reg. 4220 (Jan. 27, 2012) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 284).
180. 78 Fed. Reg. 70,163.
181. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2019, at 21– 
22 (2019). The EIA opines that electricity generation from both coal and nuclear
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138 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
Thus, there is a growing need for a coherent, critical, and pragmatic
consideration of the pathways of controlling the environmental
externalities and impact of existing and proposed networks and facilities.
B. Controlling Emissions Along the Gas Supply Chain
The efforts to address global warming and climate change are being
undertaken via the auspices of the 1992 United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change and subsequent protocols and agreements,
such as the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement.182 In the U.S., neither the
Clinton administration that signed the 1997 Kyoto Protocol nor the
subsequent Bush administration made concrete efforts to regulate
GHGs.183 Rather it was the Obama-era EPA that commenced significant
efforts to connect atmospheric concentration of GHGs with the
endangerment of public safety and welfare, consequently justifying the
need to regulate GHG emissions. The Obama-era efforts relied mostly on
the framework provided under the Clean Air Act (CAA) of 1970 even 
though the law was originally designed to regulate air pollutants regarded
as harmful to social health and wellbeing.
The CAA requires stationary sources of pollution, such as power
plants, to secure a permit from state regulators before emitting criteria
pollutants such as lead, carbon monoxide, ozone, SO2, particulate matter,
and NOx.184 The main objective is to encourage active measures for
internalizing the external environmental costs of combustion by requiring
the installation of pollution control facilities. Such permits typically
include limits to the emissions and reflect certain technology-based
standards that are defined by the CAA. The stringency of the limits or
standards depends on whether the source is within an area that is regarded
to have attained the national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for
the pollutants in question. If the plant is within the attainment area, then
is expected to decline in the outlook to 2050. From a 28% share in 2018, coal
generation drops to 17% of total generation by 2050. Nuclear generation
expectedly declines from a 19% share of total generation in 2018 to 12% by 2050.
The share of natural gas generation rises from 34% in 2018 to 39% in 2050, and
the share of renewable generation increases from 18% to 31%.
182. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted
May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107; Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted Dec. 11, 1997, 2303
U.N.T.S. 162; Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, adopted Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104.
183. EISEN ET AL., supra note 104, at 58–259.
184. Id.
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1392021] NATURAL GAS IN A CARBON-CONSTRAINED WORLD
the owner must obtain a Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD)
permit and the emissions limit must reflect the best available control
technology (BACT).185 In non-attainment areas, the limits must reflect the
‘lowest achievable emissions rate’ (LAER).186 
The CAA creates a framework in which the prevention and control of
air pollution is the primary responsibility of individual states and local
governments, even though the federal government’s financial assistance
and leadership are essential to accomplish these goals. The system is often
referred to as a "cooperative federalism" structure under which the federal
government develops baseline standards that the states individually
implement and enforce. As noted earlier, states are allowed to employ
standards that are more stringent than those specified by the federal
agencies involved in the implementation and rulemaking process. Based
on the CAA, the EPA is responsible for developing acceptable NAAQS
which are meant to set a uniform level of air quality across the U.S. to
protect society and the environment. The specific decisions regarding how
to meet the NAAQS are left to individual states’ regulatory agencies and 
policymakers. Also, each state is required to create and submit an
Implementation Plan (SIP) to the EPA. The SIP should outline the
framework for the implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of
NAAQS within the state. After submitting a SIP to the EPA and receiving
approval from the latter, its requirements become federal law and are fully
enforceable in federal court.187 Notably, states must also regulate all
stationary sources located within the areas covered by the SIPs and
implement a mandatory permit program that sets limitations to the amount
and types of emissions that each stationary source is allowed to discharge.
The permit issued as a result “is intended to be a source-specific 
compendium for Clean Air Act compliance containing in a single,
comprehensive set of documents, all [Clean Air Act] requirements
relevant to the particular polluting source.”188 
The CAA was originally designed to regulate toxic, hazardous, and
criteria pollutants that directly impact the health and safety of human life
and society.189 It aimed primarily at addressing the emissions of such air
pollutants from sources such as the increasing fleet of coal plants,
industrial processes, and fossil-fuel combustion emitting pollutants like
carbon monoxide, lead, and sulfur dioxide. The formation of the EPA and
185. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) (2018).
186. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(a)(2).
187. See Wyoming v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, No. 2:16-CV-0285-SWS, 2017 
WL 161428 (D. Wyo. Jan. 16, 2017).
188. Id.
189. Id.
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the enactment of the CAA was part of a coherent national-level framework
to clean up the air and deal with air pollution in the U.S.190 As may be 
gathered from previous discussions in Part I and II, GHGs such as carbon
dioxide are not ipso facto toxic or directly harmful to human health.
Rather, it is the cumulative effects of the atmospheric concentration of
GHGs (to the extent of altering the natural balance of such substances with
the earth’s ecosystem) that creates the potential adverse impacts such as
global warming, rising sea levels, floods, increase in ground-level ozone
(smog), and changing weather patterns that could create droughts in some
regions. As a result, it is useful to consider the background and opinion of
the U.S. Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA191 to appreciate the
challenge of regulating GHGs given the current haphazard state of climate
change-related statutory and regulatory framework in the U.S.
In 1999, some organizations filed a petition requesting that the EPA
issue rules for the regulation of four greenhouse gases, including carbon
dioxide emitted from new motor vehicles. Following public comments, the
EPA (in the Republican/Bush era) denied the petition in 2003, stating that:
(a) it did not have authority under the CAA to issue mandatory regulations 
to address the global issue of climate change because Congress would have
explicitly directed EPA to do so if Congress so intended. As a result,
greenhouse gases could not be considered “air pollutants” under the CAA;
(b) even if it did have authority, it would be unwise to set greenhouse gas
emission standards at this time because: (i) there was uncertainty regarding
the link between greenhouse gases and global warming; (ii) mandatory
regulation was a piecemeal approach that would interfere with the
President’s more comprehensive approach; and (iii) it might hamper the
President’s ability to persuade developing countries to limit greenhouse
gas emissions.192 
190. The burning of coal produces particulate matter which causes respiratory 
problems and heart and lung disease. These particulates can also contain mercury,
a toxic metal that can enter the food chain through deposition of combustion 
particulates into waterways. Sulfur dioxide (SO2) mixes with moisture in the upper
atmosphere and forms sulfuric acid which leads to acid rain—damaging vegetation 
and aquatic environments. Nitrogen oxides are a precursor to acid rain and ground
level ozone i.e. smog which triggers respiratory problems in some humans. See Coal 
Explained: Coal and the Environment, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., www.eia
.gov/energyexplained/coal/coal-and-the-environment.php [https://perma.cc/2A99-
JQBZ] (last updated Dec. 1, 2020).
191. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
192. See Massachusetts v. EPA, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice
.gov/enrd/massachusetts-v-epa [https://perma.cc/TX9E-DGD3] (last updated
May 14, 2015).
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1412021] NATURAL GAS IN A CARBON-CONSTRAINED WORLD
Subsequently, Massachusetts and twelve other states challenged the
EPA in the D.C. Circuit, and a divided panel upheld the EPA’s decision
not to dabble with GHG regulation.193 On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari and addressed inter alia the issue of whether the EPA
had statutory authority to regulate GHG emissions from new motor
vehicles, and if so, whether the reason stated for refusing to do so was
consistent with the CAA.194 In its argument to support the earlier decision
that it didn’t have regulatory authority, the EPA contended that (i)
Congress was aware of the climate change issue when it did its last
comprehensive review of the CAA in 1990 and decided not to adopt a
proposed amendment that could have specifically imposed binding
limitations—Congress focused more on pollutants that depleted the ozone
layer; and (ii) GHGs are not air pollutants as contemplated by Congress
under the CAA—arguing that if CO2 can be considered an air pollutant,
the only feasible method was to impose fuel economy standards through
the Department of Transportation.195 
In delivering the majority opinion, Justice Stevens stated that the text
of the CAA foreclosed the EPA’s contentions due to its definition of “air
pollutant” as any air polluting agent or combination of such agents,
whether physical or chemical substances, which are emitted into the air.
Thus, given the reference to all airborne compounds, CO2, methane,
nitrous oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons are substances that are emitted into
the air and, therefore, they are pollutants as contemplated under the
CAA.196 The Court held, further, that while Congress at the time of
enacting the CAA might not have appreciated the possibility that burning
fossil fuels could lead to global warming or expressly provided for the
regulation of GHGs by the EPA in its 1990 amendments, Congress did
understand that without regulatory flexibility, changing circumstances and
scientific developments could eventually render the CAA obsolete. With
this line of reasoning, the Supreme Court could be said to have adopted
the “mischief rule” of statutory interpretation by attempting to (i)
determine the intention of Congress, finding the defect in a statute that was 
enacted decades before the science of climate change gained the traction
it currently has, and (ii) to implement a remedy in the context of the case
under consideration.197 




197. The Mischief Rule approach to statutory interpretation by common law
judges entails the doctrine that a statute should be interpreted by firstly identifying
the problem or ‘mischief’ the law was designed to remedy and then adopting a
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142 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
From a literal standpoint, one could flag some issues regarding the
application of the EPA’s authority to regulate GHGs, such as methane and
CO2 under the CAA. However, it is also reasonable to expect science and
reality to evolve past the verbatim provisions of a statute enacted as far
back as the 1970s and last amended in the 1990s. The Supreme Court
opined that there is a presumption that the broad language used in the
CAA’s § 202 (a)(1) on emission standards for new motor vehicles or new
motor vehicle engines reflects the flexibility needed to prevent the CAA
from becoming obsolete and inapplicable to situations where the
lawmakers would have intended in the future.198 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court held that GHGs fit well within the CAA definition of “air
pollutants.”199 Accordingly, the EPA has the statutory authority to regulate 
the emission of such gases from new motor vehicles.200 By and large, CO2 
and GHGs are now classified as pollutants under the CAA following the
construction that will suppress the problem and advance the remedy. It is a British
version of purposivism. In this approach the words of a text are expanded or
contracted from their usual meaning to carry out the legislative purpose. See
Mischief rule, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
198. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
199. Id.
200. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia pointed out inter alia that: (a)
redress to grievances and questions in issue in this case is the function of Congress
and the Chief Executive, rather than the federal courts; (b) when the EPA as
administrator makes a judgment whether to regulate GHGs, such must relate to
the whether they are “air pollutants” that cause or contribute to air pollution which
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. The CAA 
says nothing about the reasons for which the administrator may defer making such
a judgment or the permissible reasons for deciding not to grapple with the issues
as in this case; (c) the reasons EPA gave are surely considerations the executive
agencies take into account when considering new fields – the impact such entry
would have on other executive branch programs or foreign policy; (d) air
pollutants is defined by the CAA “as any pollution agent of any combustion of 
such agents” including physical or chemical that is emitted into the ambient air.
The court is right about how CO2, methane, and hydrofluorocarbons fit within the
second part of the definition and fails to consider the first part of the definition. In
order to be an “air pollutant” the substance or matter being emitted has to be an
air pollution agent or the combustion of such agents; (e) in deciding whether it
had authority to regulate GHGs, the EPA had to decide whether the concentration
of GHGs regarded as responsible for “global” climate change qualifies as air
pollution in the US context; and (f) regulating the buildup of carbon dioxide and
other GHGs in the upper reaches of the atmosphere considered to be responsible
for climate change is not akin to regulating the concentration of some substances
that are polluting the air.
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1432021] NATURAL GAS IN A CARBON-CONSTRAINED WORLD
Massachusetts v. EPA case,201 although the EPA could still decline to 
regulate under Title II for permissible reasons.
In 2009, the Obama-EPA decided that GHGs from cars and trucks
endanger public health and welfare, thus leading to more specific
rulemaking regarding mobile and stationary sources of GHGs.202 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court in American Electric Power Co. v.
Connecticut,203 unanimously held that the EPA has the authority to
regulate GHGs under section 111(b) of the CAA concerning stationary
sources and that the CAA displaced federal common law public nuisance
claims related to GHG emissions from power plants. The decision’s
rationale was because the U.S. Congress had delegated to the EPA the
authority to decide whether and how to regulate pollutants, such as GHG
emissions, from power plants under CAA section 111.204 
This line of thought recognizes that an essential aim of regulation
would be to ensure that operators act in an environmentally responsible
manner, giving the externalities arising from their activities on society and
its climate change forcing impact. In carrying out this role, it is essential 
to examine the regulatory model and approach,205 including the costs of
regulation vis-à-vis the opportunity costs of not regulating or providing a
comprehensive legal and policy framework for such crucial issues with the
potential for being controversial socially, economically, and politically. 
In Michigan v. EPA, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the EPA
interpreted 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) of the CAA unreasonably when it
refused to consider the cost of regulating power plants in the context of the
case.206 In its grant of certiorari following a decision by the U.S. Court of
201. 549 U.S. 497.
202. See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse
Gases under the Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,495 (Dec.
15, 2009).
203. 564 U.S. 410 (2011).
204. Id.
205. There are different approaches and models of regulation such as
performance- based, market-based, incentive-based, and the more traditional and
often inefficient command-and-control. In an energy context where the concept
of “public-service” and commercial viability of utilities is an imperative, and the
tendencies of vertical integration and regulatory capture, the choice is often very
essential and the more efficient ones are more often than not the less
confrontational approach where relevant stakeholders and operators focus less on
being powerful and right and more on public service, innovative solutions and
balancing out the energy trilemma. See John Gulliver & Donald N. Zillman,
Contemporary United States Energy Regulation, in REGULATING ENERGY AND 
NATURAL RESOURCES 113–136 (Barry Barton et al., eds., 2006).
206. Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743 (2015).
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144 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme Court in Michigan v. EPA
reiterates as follows:
[The CAA directs the EPA to regulate] emissions of hazardous air
pollutants from certain stationary sources (such as refineries and
factories). The Agency may regulate power plants under this 
program only if it concludes that “regulation is appropriate and
necessary” after studying hazards to public health posed by
power-plant emissions. Here, EPA found power-plant regulation
“appropriate” because the plants’ emissions pose risks to public
health and the environment and because controls capable of
reducing these emissions were available. It found regulation
‘necessary’ because the imposition of other [CAA] requirements
did not eliminate those risks.207 
The Supreme Court, however, discountenanced the EPA’s opinion that
consideration of the costs was unnecessary even when it had estimated that
the cost of its regulations to power plants in the context of the case would 
be about $9.6 billion a year, which is more than the quantifiable benefits
from the resulting reduction in the hazardous-air-pollutant arising
therefrom which would be $4 to $6 million a year.208 From a purely
“environmentally conscious stakeholder’s purview,” the costs of not
regulating emissions which could be seen as “losing the benefits” of
reductions should almost always be prioritized. Conversely, the purely
commercial profit-centered industry stakeholder seeks to prioritize the
significant costs of compliance; thus, the average utility or operator that
would be impacted by the regulation may prefer to avoid additional
compliance and regulatory costs if such is higher than the overall estimated
benefits (depending on whether the cost-benefit analysis was properly and
comprehensively done). 
From a pragmatic “energy policy” purview, the prevention of harm to
the environment and society should be equally as important as meeting the 
reasonable returns and affordability and security of supply concerns. To
align these competing interests and objectives, it is noted that the three
207. Id. at 743 (internal citations omitted).
208. Note that the Supreme Court had previously held that the relevant
statutory provision unambiguously precluded agency cost considerations, see
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 471 (2001), and later on it
deferred to agency decisions to consider costs, see EPA v. EME Homer City 
Generation, L.P., 572 U.S. 489, 519 (2014); Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 
556 U.S. 208, 222 (2009). See also Case Comment, Constitutional Law: Michigan
v. EPA, 129 HARV. L. REV. 181, 311–20 (2015).
350308-LSU_EL_9-1_Text.indd  149 2/25/21  8:41 AM




   
  
   
  




    
  
   
  
    
  











   
  




      
    
    
    
    
 
 
1452021] NATURAL GAS IN A CARBON-CONSTRAINED WORLD
dimensions of the energy trilemma or policy are not necessarily mutually
exclusive. The competing interests are often influenced by economics 
versus public-interest considerations and are usually rooted in our law and
politics framework or the political economy. Hence the need for
coherence, trust and accountability in the design of guidelines and
applicable rules as well as an independent umpire, i.e., the relevant
regulatory agency. In reality, organizational institutions and regulatory
agencies are increasingly being influenced by the whims and caprices of
the executive and political officeholders.
Another Supreme Court decision that exemplifies the state of
complexity in the extant regulatory framework afforded under the CAA is
the Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA where it was held that emissions
of GHGs alone from stationary sources could not activate both the PSD
program and Title V permitting requirements under the CAA
framework.209 It is, however, possible to apply the PSD program’s BACT
requirement to the emission of GHGs from those sources that emit
sufficient quantities of other pollutants that are or would be ordinarily
subject to the PSD framework.210 
1. Influencing the Federal Agencies and Other Institutions
At least three federal agencies have the statutory authority that is
relevant to the regulation of methane emissions in the U.S., including (i)
the EPA under the CAA; (ii) the BLM under the Mineral Leasing Act of
1920; and (iii) the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 
Administration (PHMSA) under several statutes, as well as the Natural
Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968.
a. The Environmental Protection Agency
The EPA is the federal government’s principal environmental
regulator and has the primary responsibility to “protect human health and
the environment” in the U.S.211 Based on the CAA, the EPA has the
authority to maintain and improve the nation’s air quality and protect the 
public from dangerous air pollutants. As discussed earlier, the EPA’s
209. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014). See also Case 
Comment, Federal Statutes and Regulations: Utility Air Regulatory Group v.
EPA, 128 HARV. L. REV. 341, 361–70 (2014).
210. Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 573 U.S. 302.
211. See Our Mission and What We Do, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency,
https://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/our-mission-and-what-we-do [https://perma.cc/8
RKN-938J] (last visited Jan. 10, 2021).
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146 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
regulation of GHGs began following the decision in Massachusetts v.
EPA, having the effect that GHGs are air pollutants as defined in the
CAA.212 The EPA is obligated to regulate any air pollutants that may
“endanger public health or welfare,” thus, after the EPA determined that
GHGs pose an endangerment, the Agency was mandated to regulate such
pollutants, including methane.213 According to its authority under the
CAA, the EPA has promulgated several regulations involving methane
emissions, including reporting requirements, permitting requirements, and
emission reduction standards.
b. GHG Reporting Program
In the fiscal year 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, Congress
directed the EPA to establish the GHG Reporting Program to collect
annual GHG emission data under its existing authority within the CAA.214 
The resulting rules require reporting of GHG emissions from all major
sectors of the economy. 215 The “Petroleum and Natural Gas Systems”
sector is subject to part 98, subpart W of the rule, and this industry sector
provides the most reporters to the program: 2,253 as of 2018.216 Subpart
W requires petroleum and natural gas systems to report emissions of CH4 
and CO2 from equipment leaks and venting annually, and emissions of
CO2, CH4, and nitrous oxide (N2O) from flaring. The reporting
requirements apply to other emissions, such as those from on-site 
combustion equipment. Petroleum and natural gas facilities may also be
subject to further reporting under other subparts of the rule.
The data collected through the Reporting Program contributes to the
EPA’s Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks, which as
shown in Parts I and II above are very instrumental in understanding the 
nature, scope, and sources of GHG emissions along the value chain. In
2019, this report revealed that methane emissions from petroleum and
212. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
213. The “endanger public health or welfare” language is found in both CAA 
§ 202(a), which gives EPA authority over automobiles (the context of the
Massachusetts v. EPA decision), and in CAA § 111, which gives EPA authority
over stationary sources, the source of most methane emissions.
214. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat.
1844 (2007); LATTANZIO, supra note 56, at 11.
215. Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 40 CFR part 98, 74 Fed. Reg.
56,259 (Oct. 30, 2009) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 98 et al.).
216. GHGRP Reported Data, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, https://www
.epa.gov/ghgreporting/ghgrp-reported-data [https://perma.cc/96RS-RXVJ] (last
visited Jan. 10, 2021).
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1472021] NATURAL GAS IN A CARBON-CONSTRAINED WORLD
natural gas systems decreased from 1990 to 2017, but these two sectors
combined still represented the largest sources of CO2 and methane
emissions in the country. Moreover, due to increases in flaring emissions,
carbon dioxide emissions from the sectors increased by 27% over the same
period.217 It is also important to stress that the combustion of fossil fuels 
(especially oil and coal for energy e.g., for electricity and heat) comprise
the vast majority of energy-related emissions, with CO2 being the main
GHG.218 
c. CAA Permitting Requirements
In 2010, the EPA issued a decision that CAA permitting requirements
would apply to GHGs when such pollutants become “subject to
regulation” under the Act.219 Consequently, methane and other GHGs
would be included in CAA permits when any new regulations controlling
GHG emissions took effect.220 However, in 2014, the Supreme Court
decision in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA modified EPA’s
interpretation of the permitting requirements.221 As discussed earlier, the
decision was to the effect that because of the ambiguities and differing
interpretation and understanding of the term “air pollutants” as defined
under the CAA and the extents of that interpretation and understanding
regarding GHGs, the EPA could not require stationary sources to receive
permits solely based on their potential to emit GHGs. Instead, if a source
was otherwise required to obtain a CAA permit—based on its emissions
of other pollutants—then the EPA could include GHGs in its permit.
In general, there are two types of CAA permits: preconstruction
permits, which are a part of the New Source Review (NSR) program, and
operating permits, also known as Title V permits. Any new stationary
sources or modifications to existing stationary sources that are considered
“major” must undergo NSR and receive either a Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration (PSD) permit or a nonattainment NSR permit. Only PSD
217. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 18, at 2-14, 3-1.
218. Id.
219. Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations That Determine
Pollutants Covered by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,003
(April 2, 2010).
220. See also OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING & STANDARDS, U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, PSD AND TITLE V PERMITTING GUIDANCE FOR GREENHOUSE
GASES 3 (2011) [hereinafter EPA PERMITTING GUIDANCE].
221. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 331 (2014).
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148 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
permits apply to GHGs.222 Once a major source is subject to PSD, to obtain 
a permit and begin construction, the emitter must meet all the requirements
of the program, the most relevant of which is the BACT requirement. A
BACT is defined inter alia as:
An emission limitation based on the maximum degree of reduction
of each pollutant subject to regulation . . . emitted from or which
results from any major emitting facility, which the permitting
authority, on a case-by-case basis, taking into account energy, 
environmental, and economic impacts and other costs, determines
is achievable for such facility through application of production
processes and available methods, systems, and techniques, 
including fuel cleaning, clean fuels, or treatment or innovative fuel
combustion techniques for control of each such pollutant . . . .223 
Accordingly, the PSD permit ensures that any new or modified major
sources will reduce their methane and regulated emissions to the greatest
extent that is technologically feasible and cost-effective by requiring such
devices before construction can begin. Although the GHG mitigation
technologies utilized are likely to vary based on the type of facility,
processes involved, and GHGs being addressed, the devices identified by
the EPA as suitable for methane reduction—such as thermal oxidizers and
the repair of equipment leaks—can be found in the EPA Clean Air
Technology Center - RACT/BACT/LAER Clearinghouse.224 
Title V operating permits are required for all major sources and certain
other sources under the CAA.225 Title V permits generally do not add
pollution control requirements but, rather, consolidate all CAA
requirements applicable to a particular source and mandate certain
procedures be followed. Required procedures include “providing a review
of permits by the EPA, states, and the public, requiring permit holders to
222. Different regions of the U.S. are classified as “attainment areas” or
“nonattainment areas” depending on whether EPA’s established NAAQS are 
exceeded for that area. The PSD program applies to attainment areas (areas not
exceeding the established NAAQS), while the nonattainment NSR permits apply
to nonattainment areas. Because NAAQs have not been established for GHGs, the
nonattainment NSR program does not apply.
223. Clean Air Act § 169(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2018).
224. EPA PERMITTING GUIDANCE, supra note 220, at 28-29; Technology
Transfer Network, Clean Air Technology Center – RACT/BACT/LAER
Clearinghouse, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://cfpub.epa.gov/rblc/
index.cfm?action=Search.BasicSearch&lang=en [https://perma.cc/YE8H-DR9Z] 
(last visited Jan. 10. 2021).
225. Clean Air Act §§ 501–507, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661–7661f.
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1492021] NATURAL GAS IN A CARBON-CONSTRAINED WORLD
track, report, and annually certify their compliance status to their permit 
requirements and otherwise ensuring that permits contain conditions to
assure compliance.”226 Therefore, the addition of GHGs to Title V permits 
does not appear to significantly alter their functioning. Concerning
methane and other GHGs, Title V permits can be viewed as a way to
improve compliance with the CAA by clarifying the exact measures that
sources must perform to control GHG pollution.
d. CAA New Source Performance Standards for Oil and Gas Systems
Clean Air Act section 111 directs the EPA to regulate emissions of air
pollutants from stationary sources. Industries that emit air pollutants are
divided into over 70 different source categories and subcategories, such as
cement plants, petroleum refineries, and sewage treatment plants.227 The 
EPA included Crude Oil and Natural Gas Production, Transmission, and
Distribution (Subpart OOOO) as a source category for the first time in
2012 (i.e., the ‘NSPS 2012’).228 Hence, as a source category, crude oil and
natural gas facilities are now subject to the New Source Performance
Standards (NSPS), the air pollution emission standards of the CAA, for
new or modified sources. The NSPS 2012 rule directly controlled VOCs 
and sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions from the affected facilities.229 
However, the EPA recognized that methane reductions would occur as a
co-benefit of the rule.
In 2016, the EPA extended the subpart OOOO regulations of the oil
and natural gas source category by promulgating subpart OOOOa, which
established the relevant performance standards based on the best system
of emissions reduction (BSER) for reducing emissions of GHGs, 
specifically methane.230 For instance, regarding fugitive emissions from
well sites and compressor stations, the BSER was determined to be
“monitoring and repair based on semiannual monitoring using optical gas 
226. EPA PERMITTING GUIDANCE, supra note 220, at 50.
227. Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources, 40 C.F.R. pt. 60
(2020).
228. Oil and Natural Gas Sector: New Source Performance Standards and
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Reviews, 77 Fed. Reg.
49,489 (Aug. 16, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63).
229. 40 C.F.R. § 60.5360 (2013). The 2012 rule applied to all oil and natural
gas facilities that commenced construction, modification, or reconstruction after
August 23, 2011, and on or before September 18, 2015.
230. Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed,
and Modified Sources, 81 Fed. Reg. 35,823, 35,825 (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
This subpart applies to facilities that commence after September 18, 2015.
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150 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
imaging” while the performance-standard required the monitoring and
repair of fugitive emission components.231 The BSER for leaks at gas
processing plants and pneumatic controllers in natural gas processing
plants was determined to be leak detection and repair and instrument air
systems, respectively.232 As discussed in Parts I and II above and depicted
in Figure 5, leaks from compressor stations and venting from pneumatic
controllers are a significant source of GHG emissions. Thus, it is
interesting to note the specific rules and performance standards being set.
Also, it is worth pointing out that during the notice-and-comment period,
the EPA received comments on capturing and control of emissions from
pneumatic controllers. 
Specifically, commenters suggested that:
[P]neumatic controllers should be required to capture emissions
through a closed vent system and route the captured emissions to
a process or a control device, similar to the approach the EPA has
taken in its proposed standards for pneumatic pumps and
compressors. The commenters cite recent Wyoming proposed
rules for existing pneumatic controllers that allow operators of
existing high-bleed controllers to route emissions to a process and
the California Air Resources Board (CARB) proposed rules which
require that operators capture emissions and route to a process 
control device. Commenters state that this approach would work
for all types of pneumatic controllers and that this approach would
be cost effective based on the costs identified for pneumatic
pumps . . . .233 
However, the EPA disregarded the recommendation and opined that:
[C]apturing and routing emissions from pneumatic controllers to
a processor control device [would not be] a viable control option
under our BSER analysis. While the commenter stated that a few
permits in Wyoming indicate that a facility is capturing emissions
from controllers and routing to a control device, we believe that
there [is] insufficient information and data available for the EPA
to establish the control option as the BSER.234 
There are divergent opinions on the BSER that are aimed at reducing
emissions for the sake of the environment, but which equally have
231. Id. at 35,826 tbl.1.
232. Id. at 35,826–27 tbl.1.
233. Id. at 35,879.
234. Id.
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1512021] NATURAL GAS IN A CARBON-CONSTRAINED WORLD
significant “cost-efficiency” implications. Perhaps, these issues could
have been better resolved by asking for more data or technical evidence
from the industry or further inquiries from advisors knowledgeable about
the proposed system.
The EPA’s justification for the NSPS 2016 was the need to improve
the effectiveness and implementation of the NSPS 2012 rules and
specifically provide standards for GHGs. The 2016 rule also covers
additional equipment and sources from oil and gas production systems that
were not previously covered by the NSPS 2012 rule, such as hydraulically
fractured oil wells. The NSPS 2016 rule among other things states:
While the controls used to meet the VOC standards in the 2012
NSPS also reduce methane emissions incidentally, in light of the
current and projected future GHG emissions from the oil and
natural gas industry, reducing GHG emissions from this source
category should not be treated simply as an incidental benefit to
VOC reduction; rather, it is something that should be directly
addressed through GHG standards in the form of limits on
methane emissions under CAA section 111(b) based on direct
evaluation of the extent and impact of GHG emissions from this
source category and the emission reductions that can be achieved 
through the best system for their reduction . . . . The high quantities
of methane emissions from the oil and natural gas source category
demonstrate that it is rational for the EPA to set methane
limitations.235 
Given the justifications stated by the EPA, some of the key requirements
of the 2016 EPA methane rule include the requirements to: (i) locate and
repair leaks, also known as “fugitive emissions”; (ii) reduce natural gas
venting and flaring; (iii) use reduced emissions completions (RECs, or
“green completions”) to capture emissions from hydraulically fractured oil
wells; (iv) route methane emissions from a pneumatic diaphragm pump to
a control device; (v) continue to follow all requirements of the NSPS 2012
rule, such as limiting emissions from storage tanks; and (vi) reduce
emissions that occur from the operation of centrifugal compressors and
reciprocating compressors, which are used at natural gas compression 
stations to move natural gas along a pipeline.
The rule includes requirements that apply at every step of the
production and transmission process: oil and natural gas well sites, natural
235. Id. at 35,841.
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152 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
gas production gathering and boosting stations, gas processing plants,
natural gas transmission compressor stations, and storage facilities.236 
The NSPS 2016 and NSPS 2012 rules arguably sought to provide a
performance-based framework of specific rules and requirements for the
operators. It also appears to be based on the need to act on emissions
information and data gathered through the reporting activities of operators
as required over a period of time as discussed in Part I and II above.
Therefore, to the extent that the rules aim at encouraging and guiding
operators to be environmentally responsible and to take active measures 
to curb emissions without unreasonably hindering lawful operations or
imposing avoidable costs, then the critique should not be a question of
creating “unnecessary” regulatory burdens as the current political leaders
seem to suggest. Rather, it appears to be a justifiable case of setting out
clear, comprehensive, and coherent rules for guiding expected behavior.
Such coherence and clarity are a hallmark of a good regulatory system.
The steps taken by the Obama-EPA before the amendments to NSPS
2012 were finalized with the NSPS 2016 rule seem to be well thought out
and follow due process. The NSPS 2016 rules and regulations took effect
on August 2, 2016.237 According to the Agency, the main rationale was to
amend the NSPS 2012 and provide updated standards.238 The EPA notably
gave due considerations to comments received during the proposal stages
including having a structured engagement process with states and
stakeholders. As part of the process, the EPA issued draft white papers
addressing various technical issues, including public and expert reviewers’
comments.239 The rules were also designed to complement other federal
actions as well as state regulations and the EPA highlights that it worked
closely with the U.S. Department of Interior's BLM during the rulemaking
process to avoid conflicts in requirements between the NSPS and BLM's
proposed rulemaking. It was also important to evaluate existing state and
local programs when developing these federal standards and attempts;
thus, the EPA noted the consideration of such potential conflicts with
existing state and local requirements.240 
236. See EPA's Actions to Reduce Methane and Volatile Organic Compound
(VOC) Emissions from the Oil and Natural Gas Industry: Final Rules and Draft
Information Collection Request Fact Sheet and Presentation, U.S. Envtl. Protection
Agency (May 2016), https://www.epa.gov/stationary-sources-air-pollution/epas-
actions-reduce-methane-and-volatile-organic-compound-voc [https://perma.cc/CL
62-SC98].
237. NSPS 2016, supra note 7.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 35,825.
240. Id.
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1532021] NATURAL GAS IN A CARBON-CONSTRAINED WORLD
Notwithstanding the above and in what appears to be mainly a
response to the existing rules for political reasons, it is noted that after the
Trump administration came into office, the EPA, which is technically the
same agency that conducted the 2016 process (but perhaps with a different
political and regulatory inclination), issued a notice of proposed
rulemaking on June 16, 2017, to stay the implementation of the NSPS
2016 rule for two years while the same (or perhaps in reality different)
EPA reconsidered the rule.241 This was done even though the NSPS 2016 
rule explicitly states that:
As the purpose of this action is to control and limit emissions of
GHG and VOC, [the] EPA seeks to confirm that all regulatory
standards are met. Any owner or operator claiming technical
infeasibility, nonapplicability, or exemption from the regulation
has the burden to demonstrate the claim is reasonable based on
the relevant information. In any subsequent review of a technical
infeasibility or nonapplicability determination, or a claimed
exemption, EPA will independently assess the basis for the claim
to ensure flaring is limited and emissions are minimized, in
compliance with the rule. Well-designed rules ensure fairness
among industry competitors and are essential to the success of
future enforcement efforts.242 
Hence, the NSPS 2016 Rule had an in-built mechanism through which
“any owner or operator claiming technical infeasibility, non-applicability,
or exemption from the regulation has the burden” could seek exemptions
or make claims requiring a review.243 
Following the Trump-EPA’s stay decision, the D.C. Circuit vacated
EPA’s administrative stay of the rule because it was unlawful under the
CAA.244 Nonetheless, the court did emphasize that even though the stay 
241. Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed,
and Modified Sources: Three Month Stay of Certain Requirements, 82 Fed. Reg.
27,641 (June 16, 2017).
242. Id. (emphasis added).
243. NSPS 2016, supra note 7, at 35,844. The purpose of the rule is to enable
the EPA to control and limit emissions of GHG and VOC. Any owner or operator
claiming technical infeasibility, non-applicability, or exemption from the
regulation has the burden to demonstrate the claim is reasonable. Additionally, in
the event of any subsequent review of a technical infeasibility or non-applicability
determination, or a claimed exemption, the EPA will independently assess the 
basis for the claim to ensure flaring is limited and emissions are minimized, in
compliance with the NSPS rule.
244. Clean Air Council v. Pruitt, 862 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
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was unlawful, the EPA can still substantially modify the rule via the
normal notice-and-comment rulemaking under the Administrative
Procedure Act. The Trump-EPA began this process on October 15, 2018,
by issuing a proposed rule.245 The public comment period for this proposal
closed on December 17, 2018, and interestingly enough, ExxonMobil, a
major oil and gas corporation, expressed support for maintaining the key
elements of the underlying Obama-EPA NSPS 2016 rule, such as leak
detection and repair programs.246 However, Exxon also applauded Trump-
EPA’s efforts to make the regulations “more cost-effective.”247 Some of
the changes proposed by the Trump-EPA include (a) weakening of the leak
detection and repair rules allowing longer intervals between inspections;
(b) a change from requiring that leaks be fixed within 30 days to requiring
that a “first attempt at the repair” be made within 30 days, with repairs
made within 60 days; (c) allowing broader use of the “technical
infeasibility” exception; and (d) allowing in-house engineers to certify
system designs and declarations of technical infeasibility.248 
On August 28, 2019, the EPA signed proposed amendments to the
2012 and 2016 NSPS rules based on removing “regulatory duplication and
sav[ing] the industry millions of dollars in compliance costs each year,
while maintaining health and environmental protection from oil and gas
sources that the Agency considers appropriate to regulate.”249 The 2019
reviews under the Trump administration aimed at, among other things,
revising the inclusion of sources in transmission and storage as part of the
source category and the inclusion of GHGs, in the form of methane, as a
regulated pollutant in NSPS 2016. The Regulatory Impact Assessment
245. Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed,
and Modified Sources Reconsideration, 83 Fed. Reg. 52,056 (Oct. 15, 2018).
246. Exxon Mobil Corporation, Comment Letter Oil and Natural Gas Sector:
Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources




248. Proposed Policy Amendments 2012 and 2016 New Source Performance
Standards for the Oil and Natural Gas Industry, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/controlling-air-pollution-oil-and-natural-gas-industry/proposed
-policy-amendments-2012-and-2016-new [https://perma.cc/WWT9-WNMS] (last 
visited Jan. 10, 2021).
249. See also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS
FOR THE PROPOSED OIL AND NATURAL GAS SECTOR: EMISSION STANDARDS FOR
NEW, RECONSTRUCTED, AND MODIFIED SOURCES REVIEW (2019), https://www
.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2019-08/documents/oil_and_natural_gas_review_
proposal_ria.pdf [https://perma.cc/RRH2-HHB3].
350308-LSU_EL_9-1_Text.indd  159 2/25/21  8:41 AM














    
  
   
   
 
  

















   
   
   
     
  
1552021] NATURAL GAS IN A CARBON-CONSTRAINED WORLD
(RIA) of the NSPS 2012 and 2016 that accompanied the 2019 proposed
rules suggest that the proposed rules will aim among other things at
rescinding the requirements of NSPS 2016, i.e., OOOOa, for: (i) sources
in the transmission and storage segment, as well as (ii) methane regulation 
requirements from sources in the production and processing segments,
while leaving VOC regulations in place for the production and processing
sources. The alternative co-proposed option considered is to rescind the
methane requirements for all affected sources.250 
The RIA states that methane control options are redundant or
seemingly unnecessary because there are VOC control options, thus, there
are no expected cost or emissions effects from removing the methane
requirements in the production and processing segments. It states further
that there are no expected cost or emissions impacts for the alternative co-
proposed option for the same reason because methane control options on
all sources would be redundant since they are already with VOC control
options.251 
According to the Trump-EPA, the proposed amendments are
estimated to save the oil and gas industry $17 to 19 million a year, for a
total of $97 to $123 million from 2019 through 2025.252 Hence, a vital
question here is: was the objective to save the industry some or a lot of
money, i.e. to be cost-efficient while dealing with emissions or to reduce
“unnecessary” regulatory burdens? And would such be justifiable enough
vis-à-vis the imperative of curbing emissions coherently and requiring
environmentally responsible action from the industry? It appears the need 
to save costs and deregulate even if gaps in regulation are created was
prioritized by the Trump-era EPA. Unfortunately, the plausibility of
political and commercial influences and by implication “regulatory 
capture” on an agency’s ability to independently decide when and how to
regulate goes against the tenets of good quality regulatory systems.
e. The Bureau of Land Management
The BLM manages public lands and subsurface estate under its
jurisdiction under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act 1976.253 
Its core mandate relates to conservation and regulation of multiple-use and
sustained yield while ensuring an environmentally responsible




253. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579,
90 Stat. 2743 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1787 (2018)).
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 254. The BLM 2016 Rule notes that “Domestic production from 96,000 
Federal onshore oil and gas wells accounts for 11 percent of the Nation's natural 
gas supply and 5 percent of its oil. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2015, operators produced 
183.4 million barrels (bbl) of oil, 2.2 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of natural gas, and 
3.3 billion gallons of natural gas liquids (NGLs) from onshore Federal and Indian 
oil and gas leases. The production value of this oil and gas exceeded $20.9 billion 
and generated over $2.3 billion in royalties, which were shared with tribes, Indian 
allottee owners, and States.” BLM 2016 Rule, supra note 8, at 83,009. 
 255. The Mineral Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. § 225 (2018), requires that leases 
granted by the BLM include a provision that such rules for the prevention of undue 
waste shall be observed. 
 256. In the Background Statement to the BLM 2016 Rule it was stated that: 
“BLM is not the only regulator with the responsibility to oversee aspects of 
onshore oil and gas production, and throughout this rulemaking the BLM has 
focused on potential interactions of this rule with other Federal, State, or tribal 
regulatory requirements. For example, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) issued rules in 2012 and early 2016 to control emissions of methane and 
volatile organic compounds (VOCs) from new, modified and reconstructed oil 
and gas wells and production equipment, and many States and tribes regulate 
aspects of the oil and gas production process to address safety, waste, production 
accountability, and/or air quality concerns. Regulatory agencies often have 
overlapping authority and may adopt very similar measures to realize those 
complementary goals, such as improving air quality and reducing waste. For 
example, measures in this rule that aim to avoid the waste of methane gas through 
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about 245 million acres of land and 700 million acres of a mineral
estate).254 The BLM 2016 Rule was issued under the MLA which requires
the BLM to ensure that lessees use all reasonable precautions to prevent
waste of oil or gas developed in the land. Furthermore, it requires that
leases issued by the BLM must ensure that operations are conducted with
reasonable diligence, skill, and care and that lessees comply with rules for
the prevention of undue waste. The main focus is on waste prevention, 
both in terms of wasting gas as a resource and preventing loss of accruable
revenues such as royalties and taxable income as a result of avoidable
waste, venting, and flaring.255 In stating its rationale or background to the
2016 Rule, it was therefore apt to pursue the objectives of ensuring that
operators act in ways that (a) promote the economical, cost-effective, and
reasonable measures to minimize gas waste, and (b) enhance the nation's
natural gas supplies, boost royalty receipts for American taxpayers, tribes,
and states. However, when the BLM’s rationale starts to speak of reducing
pollution and preventing climate change due to venting, flaring, and leaks
of gas, then it raises the question of potential encroachment on the
jurisdiction of the EPA under the CAA.256 
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1572021] NATURAL GAS IN A CARBON-CONSTRAINED WORLD
During the Obama administration, the BLM 2016 Rule was effective
from January 17, 2017. The objective was to effectively replace the
previously applicable framework for regulating venting, flaring, and
royalty-free use of gas on Federal Land, i.e. the 1979 Notice to Lessees
and Operators of Onshore Federal and Indian Oil and Gas Leases, Royalty
or Compensation for Oil and Gas Lost (NTL-4A). Furthermore, it aimed
at stipulating the rules for the “waste” of natural gas due to venting, flaring, 
and leaks during oil and gas production operations on onshore Federal and
Indian (other than Osage Tribe) leases, as well as define the contexts in
which such lost or wasted gas could be subject to royalties or when it
would be considered royalty-free on-site. Although the regulations aimed
at stopping or reducing “waste” through flaring, venting, and leaks, it
would have the indirect impact of reducing the pollution and GHG
emissions attributable to such activities as discussed previously in Parts I
and II.
The elaborate process undertaken before the issuance of the BLM
2016 rule requires carrying out consultations with tribal leaders, state
authorities, companies and NGOs, and relevant stakeholders, including
public meetings in Colorado, New Mexico, North Dakota, and
Washington, DC.257 In the build-up to the 2016 rule, the BLM received
and considered approximately 330,000 public comments on the proposed
rule, including approximately 1,000 unique comments.258 It is therefore 
interesting to note the different actions taken by the Trump administration
and the 115th Congress to target the BLM 2016 Rule as part of an elaborate
deregulatory drive.
f. Dismantling of the “Obama” 2016 BLM Methane Rule
First, the rule was slated for revocation by the Congressional Review 
Act (CRA). Under the CRA, Congress has 60 days to review major
regulations before they go into effect; if both houses disapprove of a rule,
then it can be repealed by a joint resolution signed by the President.259 
Because a president can simply veto a resolution attempting to overturn a
regulation promulgated by his administration, the CRA is viewed as a
protection against “midnight” legislation by a president about to leave the
venting or leaks will also reduce methane pollution.” BLM 2016 Rule, supra note
8, at 83,010 (emphasis added).
257. Id.
258. Id. Such unique comments came from the oil and gas industry and trade
associations, NGOs representing over 37 organizations, government officials or
elected representatives, and from private citizens.
259. Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808 (2018).
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158 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
office.260 Before President Trump, the CRA had only been successfully 
used once, at the beginning of the Bush presidency in 2001.261 During the
first months of Trump’s term, however, Congress considered 33
regulations for repeal under the CRA.262 The CRA resolution addressing
the BLM 2016 Rule narrowly failed in the Senate, losing by only one
vote.263 
After the attempted repeal via the CRA, the BLM issued a
postponement of most of the provisions of the rules.264 However, because
the rule had already gone into effect and BLM did not engage in proper
rulemaking, the postponement was vacated following a suit brought by 
California, New Mexico, and a coalition of seventeen conservation and
tribal citizens groups against BLM which claimed that the latter violated
the Administrative Procedures Act publishing a notice postponing the
compliance dates for certain sections of the BLM 2016 Rules on Waste
Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties.265 Thus, the BLM 2016 rule
was back in place. Thereafter, the Trump-BLM commenced a notice-and-
comment rulemaking to suspend the rule,266 but this suspension was also
260. Susan E. Dudley, Don’t Write Off the Congressional Review Act Yet, 
YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.yale
jreg.com/nc/dont-write-off-the-congressional-review-act-yet-by-susan-e-dudley/ 
[https://perma.cc/L8TD-DDW6].
261. Id. However, before Trump’s term, Congress had passed five other
resolutions of disapproval, but each were vetoed by President Obama. See MAEVE 
P. CAREY & CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43992, THE
CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT (CRA): FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 5 (2020).
262. Eric Lipton & Jasmine C. Lee, Which Obama-Era Rules Are Being
Reversed in the Trump Era, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2017), https://www.ny
times.com/interactive/2017/05/01/us/politics/trump-obama-regulations-reversed.
html [https://perma.cc/PA74-HKKJ].
263. Valerie Volcovici, Bid to Revoke Obama Methane Rule Fails in Surprise 
U.S. Senate Vote, REUTERS (May 10, 2017, 9:40 AM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-usa-congress/bid-to-revoke-obama-methane-rule-fails-in-surprise-u-s-
senate-vote [https://perma.cc/W57K-KSMN]. The resolution failed 49 to 51, but
it can be assumed that Vice President Pence would have sided with Trump to
break the 50-50 vote in favor of disapproval.
264. Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource
Conservation; Postponement of Certain Compliance Dates, 82 Fed. Reg. 27,430
(June 15, 2017).
265. California v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 277 F. Supp. 3d 1106 (N.D.
Cal. 2017).
266. Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource
Conservation; Delay and Suspension of Certain Requirements, 82 Fed. Reg.
58,050 (Dec. 8, 2017).
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1592021] NATURAL GAS IN A CARBON-CONSTRAINED WORLD
invalidated when it was enjoined by the court.267 The same day the
Suspension Rule was enjoined, the BLM released a Revised Rule which
repealed most of the BLM 2016 Rule as promulgated by the Obama
administration.268 After issuance of the proposed rule, the Wyoming
District Court in Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior ordered a stay of the
implementation of major provisions of the original BLM 2016 Rule,
preventing the rule from going into effect.269 On September 28, 2018,
BLM issued its Final Rule modifying the 2016 Methane Rule, and this
new rule went into effect on November 27, 2018.270 The Wyoming Case
exemplifies some of the issues discussed earlier in this Article, especially
about properly defining and effectively implementing the roles of various
institutions.
On January 16, 2017, a Wyoming federal court declined to issue a
preliminary injunction staying the effective date of the BLM 2016 Rule.271 
In this case, the states of Wyoming, Montana, and North Dakota requested
that the court enjoin the rule before it takes effect on January 17, 2017,
because according to them, the rule represents unlawful agency action
since it exceeds BLM's statutory authority and is otherwise arbitrary and
capricious.272 It was held that the petitioners had not shown a “clear and
unequivocal right to relief” because the court was unable to conclude that
the rule’s provisions “lack a legitimate, independent waste prevention
purpose or are otherwise so inconsistent with the [Clean Air Act] as to
exceed BLM’s authority and usurp that of the EPA, states, and tribes.”273 
Though the court questioned whether the “social cost of methane” was an 
appropriate factor to consider in issuing a “resource conservation rule”
under the Mineral Leasing Act, the court said it could not conclude “at this
point” that the rule was arbitrary and capricious.274 
267. California v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 286 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1076 (N.D.
Cal. 2018).
268. Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource
Conservation; Rescission or Revision of Certain Requirements, 83 Fed. Reg. 7924
(Feb. 22, 2018) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 3160, 3170).
269. Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 366 F. Supp. 3d 1284 (D. Wyo. 2018),
vacated by 768 F. App’x. 790 (10th Cir. 2019).
270. Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource
Conservation; Rescission or Revision of Certain Requirements, 83 Fed. Reg.
49,184 (Sep. 28, 2018) (codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 3160, 3170).
271. Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, No. 2:16-CV-0285-SWS, 2017 WL
161428 (D. Wyo. Jan. 16, 2017) (Order on Motions for Preliminary Injunction).
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at *10.
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160 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
g. Comparison of BLM’s 2016 and 2018 Final Rules
In examining the key implications of the Trump-BLM’s 2018 rule it
is opined here that the following requirements of the 2016 rule were
removed in their entirety: (i) waste minimization plans; (ii) well drilling
and completion requirements; (iii) pneumatic controller and diaphragm
pump requirements; (iv) storage vessels requirements; and (v) leak
detection and repair requirements. The following requirements of the 2016
rule were modified and/or replaced: (i) Gas-capture requirement –The
BLM will now defer to state or tribal regulations in determining when the
flaring of associated gas from oil wells will be royalty-free; (ii) Downhole
good maintenance and liquids unloading requirements; and (iii) Measuring
and reporting volumes of gas vented and flared.
By and large, the final 2018 BLM Methane Rule eliminated key
requirements of the 2016 Rule and reinstated the previous regulations
(known as “NTL-4A”) that date back to the 1970s. The 2016 rule applied
to both new and existing oil and natural gas activities on federal lands,
meaning that it covered some facilities not regulated by the EPA rules,
which only cover new and modified sources. Natural gas at oil wells
(associated gas) is often vented or flared, resulting in substantial waste,
and the 2016 BLM Rule had set reasonable “capture targets” to require
producers to capture an increasing percentage of all associated gas: 85%
in 2018 and up to 98% in 2026. The capture targets have been completely
eliminated in the 2018 Final Rule issued by the Trump-BLM, and
producers will only be forced to capture associated gas where required by
state regulations. Similar to the EPA requirement, the 2016 regulations
required regular inspections for methane leaks and the repair of any leaks
detected. However, the 2018 BLM rule also completely rescinded these
requirements.
After BLM released the language of the final 2018 rule, the states of
California and New Mexico sued the Agency, alleging the regulation was
unlawfully promulgated in the case California v. Bernhardt.275 If the new
275. 472 F. Supp. 3d 573 (N.D. Cal. 2020). The case of California v. 
Bernhardt, Case No. 4:18-cv-05712-YGR (N.D. Cal.) was consolidated with the
Complaint, Sierra Club v. Zinke, 3:18-cv-05984 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 18, 2018). Note
that on July 15, 2020, the court ordered that the 2018 Revision Rule be vacated.
Id. Furthermore, on October 29, 2020, the Northern District of California entered
judgment vacating the 2018 final rule rescinding the BLM 2016 Rule. The federal
defendants and trade group intervenor-defendants have appealed the court’s July
2020 decision vacating much of the 2018 rule. On October 8, the District of
Wyoming vacated the 2016 rule, with judgment entered on October 23. No
appeals have been filed yet as at the time of writing. For updates see
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1612021] NATURAL GAS IN A CARBON-CONSTRAINED WORLD
rules stay in place, the drastic changes made to both the BLM Methane
and Waste Prevention Rule and the EPA NSPS related to methane are
likely to weaken the regulations’ ability to limit methane and relevant
GHG emissions.
h. Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
The U.S. Department of Transportation’s PHMSA has the authority to
regulate the safety of pipelines and underground natural gas storage
facilities. President Obama provided some additional mandates to the
Agency, including some affecting GHG emissions, when he signed the
Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011 and
the Protecting our Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety Act of
2016. However, all of these mandates have not been fulfilled.276 In
response to Southern California Gas Company’s large natural gas leak that
remained out of control from October 2015 to February 2016, PHMSA
was authorized to issue safety standards for underground natural gas
storage facilities. PHMSA also has the authority to set standards for the
use of pipeline leak detection systems, automatic shut-off valves, and
accident notification systems which can all help to lower methane
emissions from the nation’s pipeline infrastructure.
i. State Actions on Methane Emissions
Most state regulations regarding methane focus on other sources of
emissions, such as landfills and local distribution infrastructure,277 but as 
the Trump administration rolls back federal protections, some states have
attempted to use state regulations to fill in the gaps. Only six states 
(California, Colorado, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Wyoming) currently
have regulations or permit requirements regarding methane or VOC
emissions from the oil and gas sector.278 New Mexico may soon be added
to this list, as the governor has ordered state regulators to develop similar
http://climatecasechart.com/case/california-v-zinke/?cn-reloaded=1 [https://perma
.cc/K4WA-S8XZ].
276. LATTANZIO, supra note 50, at 13–14.
277. State Methane Policies, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, (Feb. 11,
2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/environment-and-natural-resources/state-meth
ane-policies.aspx [https://perma.cc/NKZ2-BJ86].
278. ENVTL. DEF. FUND, LEADING REGULATORY PRACTICES TO ABATE OIL
AND GAS METHANE EMISSIONS: LESSONS LEARNED FROM MEXICO (2018),
https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/documents/MX%20Methane%20Regs_Fa 
ctSheet_English.pdf [https://perma.cc/EL24-4L32].
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162 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
rules.279 In Pennsylvania, the state Department of Environmental
Protection proposed a new rule limiting methane and VOC emissions in
April 2019, and the State Senate Democratic Policy Committee was
discussing making the regulations even tighter.280 Colorado has been
considered the leader in methane leak reduction because it passed the first
regulations in the country requiring producers to routinely check oil and
gas wells for methane leaks and to fix leaky equipment. Colorado’s
regulations in 2014 actually preceded the EPA’s 2016 methane standards
and were considered to be more protective than the EPA rule. Two years
after Colorado’s rule went into effect, the Colorado Department of Public
Health and Environment announced a 75% drop in oil and gas sites with
detected methane leaks.281 
Advocates for stronger federal standards have argued that the federal
government should at least set a regulatory floor to avoid a race to the
bottom approach among some states hoping to attract production
companies with the promise of limited regulation. However, the Trump
administration has often espoused the opposing view that any actions by
the federal government would only add confusion and complexity because 
of duplicative state regulations.282 However, this argument seems to ignore
the fact that many federal environmental rules, for example, the Obama
BLM’s 2016 methane rule, allow states to formulate their regulations and
279. Laila Kearny & Jennifer Hiller, New Mexico Governor Moves to Limit




280. Elizabeth Hardison, Environmental Proponents to State Senate Panel: Pa.
Needs Better Methane Regulations, PA. CAPITAL-STAR (Apr. 23, 2019), https://
www.penncapital-star.com/blog/environmental-proponents-to-state-senate-panel-
pa-needs-better-methane-regulations/ [https://perma.cc/XV3B-VZEY].
281. Cathy Proctor, EPA Follows Colorado Lead in Targeting Methane Leaks
From Oil & Gas, DENVER BUS. J. (May 12, 2016), https://www.bizjournals.com
/denver/blog/earth_to_power/2016/05/epa-follows-colorado-lead-in-targeting-metha
ne.html [https://perma.cc/P669-R3PM].
282. See, e.g., Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and
Resource Conservation; Rescission or Revision of Certain Requirements, 83 Fed.
Reg. 49,184, 49,188 (Sep. 28, 2018) (“The existence of methane emissions
regulations in these states highlights the unnecessary regulatory overlap and
duplication created by the 2016 rule.”).
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1632021] NATURAL GAS IN A CARBON-CONSTRAINED WORLD
receive a variance from the appropriate federal agency, as long as the state
or local rules are as effective as the federal regulation.283 
CONCLUSION
This Article builds on the premise that in the most ideal scenarios 
policy and regulatory frameworks should: (i) exemplify coherence rather
than uncertainty; (ii) protect regulatory independence and accountability
rather than susceptibility to the dictates of various interest groups in the
energy spectrum; and (iii) support efficient communication and
information sharing between the regulator and industry. In a carbon-
constrained world where energy supply systems and markets are facing
increasing scrutiny and justifiable calls for greater environmental
responsibility and accountability, the development of such high-quality 
regulatory and policy frameworks should be a priority. As discussed
above, especially in Parts I and II, the “cleaner” energy and environmental
case for gas compared to other hydrocarbons do not depend on beating the 
emissions performance of these other carbon-intensive energy sources;
rather, it is more likely to depend on the willingness of the relevant
operators and institutions to work together to ensure the emissions
attributable to the gas production and supply chain is as low as practicable
or competes favorably with the increasing array of net-zero carbon or zero-
carbon sources. This presupposes the development, investments in, and
implementation of necessary innovations and technologies exemplified in
concepts such as the BSER and the BACT and also leading to the large-
scale cost-efficient deployment of emissions removal technologies, such
as CCUS and methane reformation. Unfortunately, such investments and
innovations are unlikely to develop at the right pace and scale without
clarity and coherence in applicable rules, regulations, and incentives.
Another important reason to tackle GHG and methane emissions from oil
and gas operations (compared to other anthropogenic sources) is that in
many cases there is a readily available path to market for the captured
methane or recycled carbon to be sold or stored safely for future use. Thus,
about 40-50% of current methane emissions could be avoided at no net
cost. Arguably, reducing oil and gas methane emissions, in particular,
remains a cost-efficient way of reducing greenhouse gas emissions
compared with other mitigation strategies.
283. See Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource
Conservation, 81 Fed. Reg. 83,008, 83,035 (codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 3100, 3160,
3170) (Nov. 18, 2016).
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Energy policy typically revolves around the need to ensure reasonable
costs and prices, reliability, and the protection of public health, safety, and
the environment. In reality, vested interests are working through the
political economy of energy supply operations and institutions as well as
the economic interests created further to property rights held by the public
and private corporations in the energy space. These interests have a
considerable impact on the processes for realizing the dimensions of
energy policy and regulation discussed in this Article.284 Being able to 
identify these misaligned interests and prevent the avoidable bottlenecks
is becoming increasingly vital in a carbon-constrained world and
transitional energy contexts.285 If energy law and regulation are 
approached from a functional standpoint as a means to a reasonable end,
then, the objectives of managing costs, reliability, and sustainability are
not inherently incompatible.
284. INNOVATION IN ENERGY LAW AND TECHNOLOGY: DYNAMIC SOLUTIONS
FOR ENERGY TRANSITIONS 2–7 (Donald Zillman et al. eds., 2018); Waste 
Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation;
Rescission or Revision of Certain Requirements, 83 Fed. Reg. 49,184.
285. DECARBONIZATION AND THE ENERGY INDUSTRY: LAW, POLICY, AND
REGULATION IN LOW-CARBON ENERGY MARKETS 401–09 (Tade Oyewunmi et al.
eds., 2020).
